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FIGHTING CYBERCRIME AFTER UNITED 
STATES V. JONES 
DAVID GRAY,* DANIELLE KEATS CITRON**  
& LIZ CLARK RINEHART*** 
 
In a landmark nondecision last term, five Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court would have held that citizens possess a Fourth Amendment 
right to expect that certain quantities of information about them will remain 
private, even if they have no such expectations with respect to any of the 
information or data constituting that whole.  This quantitative approach to 
evaluating and protecting Fourth Amendment rights is certainly novel and 
raises serious conceptual, doctrinal, and practical challenges.  In other 
works, we have met these challenges by engaging in a careful analysis of 
this “mosaic theory” and by proposing that courts focus on the 
technologies that make collecting and aggregating large quantities of 
information possible.  In those efforts, we focused on reasonable 
expectations held by “the people” that they will not be subjected to broad 
and indiscriminate surveillance.  These expectations are anchored in 
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Founding-era concerns about the capacity for unfettered search powers to 
promote an authoritarian surveillance state.  Although we also readily 
acknowledged that there are legitimate and competing governmental and 
law enforcement interests at stake in the deployment and use of surveillance 
technologies that implicate reasonable interests in quantitative privacy, we 
did little more.  In this Article, we begin to address that omission by 
focusing on the legitimate governmental and law enforcement interests at 
stake in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting cyberharassment and 
healthcare fraud. 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until the middle of the October 2011 Term, the prevailing view on 
how to measure Fourth Amendment interests and where to draw the line 
between subconstitutional surveillance and a Fourth Amendment “search” 
focused on identifying “reasonable expectations of privacy.”2  If law 
enforcement officers did not enter private spaces, intrude on private 
interactions, or otherwise invade a defendant’s subjectively manifested and 
objectively reasonable expectations of privacy, then they were left to pursue 
their investigations unfettered by Fourth Amendment constraints or 
concerns.  Even if an investigative method or strategy did invade a person’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy, the Fourth Amendment did not bar law 
enforcement officers from using it.  Rather, the Fourth Amendment 
required that law enforcement’s discretion be limited to ensure a reasonable 
balance between the government’s interests and the privacy interests of 
those subject to search. 
Until relatively recently, the contours of reasonable expectations of 
privacy, as well as the balance between law enforcement’s interests and 
those of the individual, were fairly stable.  In United States v. Jones3 the 
Court indicated that the ground has begun to shift.  As we have become 
more dependent on networked devices and as public spaces are increasingly 
tracked and traced, we expose more of ourselves to governmental actors and 
to third parties.  As Justice Sotomayor noted in Jones, the government, by 
itself and through its contracted agents, now has access to powerful 
surveillance technologies and sophisticated software that is capable of 
aggregating and analyzing massive quantities of data.4  For the most part, 
this literally occurs in bits and bytes that mean little when considered 
discretely.  When aggregated together, however, these isolated events 
produce a revealing and disconcertingly vivid picture of our lives.5 
 
1 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
3 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
4 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
5 See David Gray & Danielle Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and 
Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
(forthcoming 2013) (observing that “although a collection of dots is sometimes nothing more 
than a collection of dots, some collections of dots, when assessed holistically, are A Sunday 
Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte”). 
748 DAVID GRAY ET AL. [Vol. 103 
Although Jones was resolved on narrow grounds, five Justices took the 
opportunity to suggest that these new surveillance capacities give law 
enforcement access to revealing informational mosaics that violate 
reasonable expectations of privacy and therefore implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.  This “mosaic theory” of Fourth Amendment privacy is novel 
and will pose serious challenges for law enforcement officials, citizens, and 
courts if it is ultimately adopted.6  Meeting these challenges will require, at 
a minimum, understanding both the privacy interests and the legitimate 
governmental interests at stake. 
The concurring Justices in Jones, joined by academic commentators,7 
have described at length the privacy interests implicated by technologies 
capable of gathering large quantities of data.  Almost absent from the 
discussion so far, however, has been any accounting of the legitimate 
governmental and law enforcement interests served by these technologies.  
That is unfortunate.  After all, it is hard to strike a reasonable balance 
between the competing interests of law enforcement and citizen privacy, as 
the Fourth Amendment requires, if we lack a clear understanding of those 
competing interests.  Our goal in this Article is to begin filling that void by 
discussing the role of data aggregation and surveillance technologies in the 
detection, investigation, and prosecution of cybercrimes. 
The social problems constituting “cybercrime” are varied and costly.  
Take for example cyberharassment, which involves patterns of online 
behavior that are intended to inflict substantial emotional distress and 
would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.8  
Multifaceted and malleable, “[c]yber harassment . . . tend[s] to involve 
explicit or implicit threats, privacy invasions, defamation, data thefts, 
impersonation, technological attacks, and[] the recruitment of third parties 
to physically harm victims.”9  Attackers hack into victims’ computers to 
steal revealing pictures and then extort them, threatening to release the 
pictures unless they agree to the harassers’ demands.10  Vengeful ex-lovers 
 
6 For an in-depth discussion of the challenges, see id. 
7 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a 
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1 (2012); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2228919. 
8 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE 3.0: THE RISE OF DISCRIMINATORY ONLINE 
HARASSMENT AND HOW TO STOP IT (forthcoming 2014).  We include under this umbrella 
cyberstalking, which tends to have a more narrow definition—repeated online behavior, with 
intent to cause fear of bodily harm—as well as other forms of cyberharassment, including 
cyberextortion and other related offenses. 
9 Id. 
10 Another related cybercrime involves data theft.  Harassers may hack into victims’ 
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post victims’ naked pictures on pornography sites alongside the suggestion 
that they are interested in anonymous sex.11  Although some attackers 
confine their hostile activities to networked technologies, others use all 
available tools to harass victims, including real-space stalking.12 
Cyberharassment has a profound impact on victims’ lives.  It causes 
debilitating psychological and emotional harm.  It damages victims’ careers 
and professional reputations.  It interferes with their educations.13  It 
silences them, discouraging them from on- and offline pursuits.  In addition 
to psychological, emotional, and social damage, cyberharassment has led to 
sexual assaults, which are sometimes committed by unwitting third 
parties.14 
Although fraud predates the computer by millennia, healthcare fraud 
provides an example of a traditional crime that has been upgraded and 
enhanced by new computer and Internet technologies.  According to 
conservative estimates, approximately $60 billion in annual Medicare 
payments are fraudulent.15  In sharp contrast, current efforts to prevent, 
 
computers to steal their intimate images; crime rings use malware to harvest personal data 
and trade secrets from infected computers.  The information is used to perpetrate identity 
theft, extortion, and industrial espionage.  Steve Towns, Strength in Numbers, GOV’T TECH. 
MAG., Oct. 2012, at 18; Stephen Cobb, Industrial Crimeware Sets a Blistering Pace, SC 
MAG. (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.scmagazine.com/industrial-crimeware-sets-a-blistering-
pace/article/255601/. 
11 See United States v. Rose, 315 F.3d 956, 957 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Rose did in fact post 
pictures of [his victim’s] children, along with their full names, address, and telephone 
number, on web sites soliciting sexual activity.”); see also United States v. Sayer, Nos. 2:11-
CR-113-DBH, 2:11-CR-47-DBH, 2012 WL 1714746, at *2  (D. Me. May 15, 2012) 
(explaining that in addition to uploading pornographic materials and the contact information 
of his victim, the stalker posted ads in her name “invit[ing] men to come to her home for 
sexual encounters”) (citations omitted).  Examples of “revenge porn” sites include Nik 
Richie’s THE DIRTY.COM, which includes explicit posts like The Dirtiest B*tch in Baltimore, 
THE DIRTY (July 20, 2011), http://thedirty.com/2011/07/the-dirtiest-btch-in-baltimore/, and 
Hunter Moore’s upcoming website HUNTERMOORE.TV, http://www.huntermoore.tv/, which 
is predicted to be a revival of his now-defunct ISANYONEUP.COM.  Kashmir Hill, Hunter 
Moore Will Post Your Nude Photos but Will Only Include Your Home Address if He Thinks 
You’re a Horrible Person, FORBES.COM (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kashmirhill/2012/12/05/hunter-moore-is-going-to-start-posting-your-nude-photos-again-but-
will-only-post-your-home-address-if-he-thinks-youre-a-horrible-person/. 
12 WORKING TO HALT ONLINE ABUSE, COMPARISON STATISTICS 2000–2012, at 3 (2012), 
available at www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/Cumulative2000-2012.pdf. 
13 CITRON, supra note 8; Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 
71–73 (2009); Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender 
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 382 (2009). 
14 See DeeDee Correll, Craigslist Implicated in Rape Case: A Wyoming Man is Accused 
of Using the Website to Engineer an Ex-Girlfriend’s Assault, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010, at 
A9. 
15 Kelli Kennedy, U.S. Charges More than 100 in Wide Medicare Fraud Bust, WASH. 
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detect, and prosecute healthcare fraud have produced only modest returns, 
recovering only $4.1 billion in 2011.16  In addition to monetary costs, 
healthcare fraud also directly threatens the safety of patients, particularly 
when schemes result in unnecessary treatments, withholding necessary 
treatments, or disbursement of improper prescriptions. 
There can be no doubt that the government has a compelling interest in 
detecting and prosecuting cybercrimes like cyberharassment and healthcare 
fraud.  New and developing surveillance technologies, particularly those 
involving data aggregation and analysis, offer law enforcement officers 
helpful tools for combating these crimes.  At the same time, these 
technologies implicate privacy interests that would be given Fourth 
Amendment status under a mosaic theory.  In this Article, we explore these 
competing interests and outline ways that courts, legislatures, and 
executives might strike a reasonable balance between them.  Part II 
provides a brief historical account of the relevant Fourth Amendment 
doctrine to put the mosaic theory in context and to explain the challenges it 
raises for identifying and balancing competing privacy and law enforcement 
interests.  Part III focuses on the government’s interest in preventing, 
detecting, and prosecuting healthcare fraud.  Part IV elaborates on the 
government’s significant interests in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting 
cyberharassment crimes.  Part V concludes. 
II. UNITED STATES V. JONES AND THE MOSAIC THEORY OF  
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY 
To understand the new law enforcement dynamic set to take hold in 
cybercrime investigations and prosecutions, it is necessary to have a clear 
understanding of both the balancing test at the core of the Fourth 
Amendment and how the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy may 
put a thumb on that scale.  That is the project for this Part. 
As Akhil Amar has explored, agents conducting searches under state 
authority were subject to civil actions long before 1791.17  The Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures draws on 
this common law history.18  In fact, for the better part of a century after it 
was ratified, the Fourth Amendment appears to have been understood 
largely as a constitutional instantiation of property rights developed and 
 
POST, Feb. 18, 2011, at A3. 
16 About Fraud, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/aboutfraud/index.html (last visited May 21, 2013). 
17 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 786 
(1994). 
18 Slobogin, supra note 7, at 12. 
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bundled through the common law of trespass.19  So much so, in fact, that 
the prevalent remedy for Fourth Amendment violations until Boyd v. United 
States20 was an action in tort.21 
A trespass-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment may well 
have served the expectations of those who read the text in 1791.  By the 
early years of the twentieth century, however, limiting the reach of the 
Fourth Amendment to physical incursions in protected places seemed 
inadequate.  First, shifts in population from the farm to the city, coupled 
with the expansion of professionalized police forces, made routine, but 
nevertheless invasive, engagements with law enforcement far more 
common than our forebears living at the turn of the nineteenth century 
could have imagined.22  Second, new technologies and their corresponding 
social expectations began to stretch common law concepts developed in the 
 
19 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) (“The well known 
historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment, directed against general warrants and writs of 
assistance, was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man’s house, his person, 
his papers and his effects; and to prevent their seizure against his will.”).  Orin Kerr has 
questioned this traditional understanding in a recent essay.  See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious 
History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154611 [hereinafter Kerr, Curious 
History].  Without delving too far, we see less space between Professor Kerr’s account and 
the orthodox view than he does.  Although the Supreme Court often cited citizens’ privacy 
interests in many of its pre-Katz cases, these interests were clearly tied to property.  This is 
no surprise.  After all, the common law has long understood property as a bundle of rights 
that can be variously acquired and alienated.  These include the rights to exclude, to peaceful 
enjoyment, and to private use.  Thus, as Professor Kerr himself has noted, the vast bulk of 
the Court’s post-Katz cases have, in fact, focused on the privacy protections that citizens 
have in certain “places.”  See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 316–17 (2012) [hereinafter Kerr, Mosaic]. 
20 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
21 See Amar, supra note 17, at 774, 785–91; David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: 
The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 
50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 19), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2200&context=fac_p
ubs [hereinafter Gray, Spectacular Non Sequitur]; see also David Gray et al., The Supreme 
Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7, 8–9 (2012) [hereinafter 
Gray, Contemporary Silver Platter]; William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 808 (2000); Potter Stewart, 
The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the 
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372–77 (1983).  
Roger Roots recently has disputed this common wisdom.  See Roger Roots, The Originalist 
Case for the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2009–2010). 
22 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471–79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The 
Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850–1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 460–61 
(2010); see also DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE UNDERWORLD 4–9, 29–40 (1979) 
(describing how urbanization was a catalyst for the development of a modern police force 
and new investigative techniques). 
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context of cases involving physical intrusions into spaces traditionally 
protected by the common law of trespass.23 
The facts of Olmstead v. United States24 provide a useful example.  A 
year after Bell and Watson’s famous first telephonically transmitted words, 
there were 3,000 telephones in service in the United States.25  The first 
coast-to-coast telephone line was completed in 1915.26  Public telephones 
made their debut in the early 1880s, but took off after William Gray’s 
invention of the coin-operated telephone in 1889.27  In 1904, there were 3.3 
million telephones in service in the United States.28  Four years later, New 
York City alone had over 800,000 telephones.29  By the time the “French 
phone” made its first appearance on the American market and AT&T 
opened the first transatlantic telephone service in 1927, the telephone had 
become a ubiquitous feature of American life.30  As with all liberty-
enhancing technologies, the telephone was also vulnerable to perversion in 
the hands of criminals.  Where this occurred, law enforcement officers had 
a natural desire to listen in. 
In Olmstead, law enforcement officers investigating a conspiracy to 
import and distribute intoxicating liquors “tapped” telephone lines using a 
crude version of today’s surveillance tools: “[s]mall wires [that] were 
inserted along the ordinary telephone wires.”31  “The[se] insertions were 
made without trespass upon any property of the defendants.”32  Via these 
 
23 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471–79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Oliver, supra note 22, at 460–
61. 
24 277 U.S. at 438. 
25 Telephone History: The Early Years 1876–1900, TELEPHONY MUSEUM 
http://www.telephonymuseum.com/telephone history.htm (last visited May 21, 2013); see 
also TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 9–32 
(2010). 
26 Telephone History: The New Century 1901–1940, TELEPHONY MUSEUM, 
http://www.telephonymuseum.com/History 1901-1940.htm (last visited May 21, 2013); see 
also WU, supra note 25. 
27 Sheldon Hochheiser, Public Telephones, IEEE USA TODAY’S ENGINEER (July 2009), 
http://www.todaysengineer.org/2009/jul/history.asp (last visited May 21, 2013); see also 
WU, supra note 25. 
28 A Brief History: Origins, AT&T, http://www.corp.att.com/history/history1.html (last 
visited May 21, 2013); see also WU, supra note 25. 
29 HERBERT N. CASSON, THE HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE 172–73 (1910), available at 
http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=CasTele.sgm&images=images/modeng&
data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=5&division=div1; see also WU, supra 
note 25. 
30 See, e.g., CLAUDE S. FISHER, AMERICA CALLING: SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE 
TO 1940, at 52–53 (1992); Getting the Radio News by Telephone, 43 POPULAR MECHANIC 
636, 636–38 (1925); Hello London!, 47 POPULAR MECHANIC 353, 353–54 (1927). 
31 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57 (1928). 
32 Id. at 457. 
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taps, the officers were surreptitiously able to listen to and record 
conversations among the conspirators, which allowed them to gather critical 
information about the conspiracy and to direct and target their interventions 
with maximum efficiency and safety.  Based in part on information 
gathered through, or as a consequence of, these wiretaps, Olmstead and his 
confederates were prosecuted and convicted for a range of Prohibition-
related offenses.  Olmstead appealed, alleging that the installation and use 
of the wiretaps violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  On certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court, the absence of any physical trespass turned 
out to be determinative. 
Writing for the majority in Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft found that all 
of the Court’s prior Fourth Amendment decisions entailed either an “actual 
entrance into private quarters” or “the taking of something tangible.”33  
Furthermore, he pointed out, the Amendment’s enumeration of “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects,” along with its requirement that warrants 
specify “the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” 
limited the scope of its protections to “material things.”34  Because the 
surveillance technique employed by the officers in Olmstead did not entail a 
physical trespass, Chief Justice Taft saw no search or seizure.35  Rather, in 
light of the fact that “[t]he evidence was secured by the use of the sense of 
hearing, and that only,”36 the Court held that the “the wiretapping here 
disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”37  Although Chief Justice Taft invited legislative 
intervention to set limits on law enforcement’s use of wiretapping 
technologies,38 he could see no constitutional authority for the Court to 
intervene in the absence of a physical trespass.39 
In a prescient dissent from the majority opinion in Olmstead, Justice 
Brandeis argued that limiting Fourth Amendment protections to the 
compass of common law trespass failed to provide adequate protections for 
 
33 Id. at 457–64. 
34 Id. at 464. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 466. 
38 The wiretapping at issue in Olmstead was conducted in violation of state law.  Id. at 
468–69.  Over Justice Holmes’s protest, id. at 470, however, the Olmstead majority 
maintained that state law could not dictate rules of evidence governing federal courts.  Id. at 
469. 
39 Id. at 465–66.  Of course, that legislation was long in coming.  It was not until 1968, 
after the Court abandoned the underlying rationale of Olmstead in Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967), that Congress finally stepped in, passing the Wiretap Act and then the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. 
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citizens at the dawn of a new technological age.40  Although he 
acknowledged the Fourth Amendment’s historical focus on physical 
trespass, Justice Brandeis argued that “a principle, to be vital, must be 
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”41  
Although “force and violence” had until then been a prerequisite for 
constitutional engagement, Justice Brandeis observed that “[s]ubtler and 
more far-reaching means of invading privacy have [since] become available 
to the Government.”42  Furthermore, he predicted that this trend would 
continue.43  In the face of increasing hostility to privacy, Justice Brandeis 
refused to accept the majority’s view that the Fourth Amendment had no 
say with regard to law enforcement’s use of expanding surveillance 
capacities in ways that could threaten “the most comprehensive of rights, 
and the right most valued by civilized men”: “the right to be let alone.”44 
In the years after Olmstead, many of Justice Brandeis’s predictions 
about the expansion of government surveillance came to pass, and his views 
 
40 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  Justice Brandeis’s dissent came as no 
surprise to students of his groundbreaking article, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890), which he cowrote with Samuel Warren.  Justice Holmes joined Justice 
Brandeis’s decision in Olmstead, but wrote separately to emphasize his view—maintained 
since at least Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)—that federal 
courts should not be in the business of sanctioning criminal conduct by law enforcement 
officers by admitting into evidence the products of illegal conduct.  See Olmstead, 277 U.S. 
at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Decency, security and liberty alike demand that 
government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to 
the citizen.  In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it 
fails to observe the law scrupulously.  Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent 
teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.  Crime is contagious.  
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.  To declare that in the administration of the 
criminal law, the end justifies the means—to declare that the Government may commit 
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible 
retribution.  Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.”).  For 
an extended explanation of Justice Holmes’s view in the context of the Court’s broader 
exclusionary rule jurisprudence, see Gray, Spectacular Non Sequitur, supra note 21. 
41 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 474 (“The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of 
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.  Ways may some day be developed by 
which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in 
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of 
the home.  Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring 
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.  ‘That places the liberty of every man in the 
hands of every petty officer’ was said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than these.  To 
Lord Camden, a far slighter intrusion seemed ‘subversive of all the comforts of society.’  
Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual 
security?”) (footnotes omitted). 
44 Id. at 478. 
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on the Fourth Amendment’s reach slowly took hold.  The Court famously 
took stock of these shifts in Katz v. United States.45  There, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation suspected that Mr. Katz was conducting an illegal 
bookmaking operation using a public telephone booth.46  To gather 
evidence against him, agents attached an electronic listening device to the 
outside of the booth.  Using that “electronic ear,” they overheard and 
recorded incriminating statements that Katz made to his clients and 
associates, which otherwise would have been kept private within the 
confines of the booth. 
There is no doubt that what the agents did in Katz constituted 
eavesdropping.  Given the Court’s holding in Olmstead, they must 
nevertheless have been quite confident in the constitutionality of their 
surveillance.47  After all, Olmstead made clear that, absent a property 
interest and physical intrusion, the Fourth Amendment imposed no 
constraints on law enforcement conduct.48  Because the phone booth in 
question was a public resource, Katz could not claim any property interest 
in it.  Moreover, even if he could claim a property interest in the booth, the 
device was attached to the outside of the booth and thus its installation and 
use did not entail a physical invasion.  By application of modus tollens to 
premises set forth by the Court in Olmstead, it therefore appeared that the 
agents’ use of an electronic device to listen surreptitiously to and record Mr. 
Katz’s conversations in that booth was not a “search” or “seizure” subject to 
Fourth Amendment regulation. 
Nevertheless, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, held that Katz’s 
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.  Citing a line of cases since 
Olmstead and the increasing ubiquity of telephone communications,49 
Justice Stewart found that “the underpinnings of Olmstead . . . have been so 
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there 
 
45 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
46 Id. at 354. 
47 Id. at 352 (“The Government contends, however, that the activities of its agents in this 
case should not be tested by Fourth Amendment requirements, for the surveillance technique 
they employed involved no physical penetration of the telephone booth from which the 
petitioner placed his calls.”). 
48 Id. at 352–53 (noting that “a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that 
surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside 
the ambit of the Constitution”). 
49 Id. at 352 (“[A] person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.  One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits 
him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece 
will not be broadcast to the world.  To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the 
vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.”). 
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enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.”50  Rather, he wrote, 
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”51  Instead of focusing 
on an individual’s property interests, the Court turned its attention to what 
Justice Harlan referred to as Katz’s “constitutionally protected reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”52  With those expectations in focus, the Court 
found that: “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his 
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . .  
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected.”53  Noting that Katz had closed 
the door of the phone booth with the reasonable expectation that his 
conversations would not be accessible to the public,54 the Court held that 
“[t]he Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording 
[Katz’s] words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while 
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”55  “The fact that the electronic 
device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of 
the booth,” Justice Stewart concluded, “can have no constitutional 
significance.”56 
Katz marked a significant shift in Fourth Amendment analysis and 
doctrine.  The threshold questions in any Fourth Amendment case are 
whether there has been a “search” or a “seizure,” and whether the litigant at 
bar has “standing” to assert a violation.  After Katz, the answer to both 
questions has been a function of whether the person alleging a Fourth 
Amendment violation has subjectively manifested an expectation of privacy 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.57  Unsurprisingly, the 
answer depends on the context.  There are, nevertheless, some broad and 
important rules.  For example, the Court has time and again defended as 
reasonable the expectations of privacy that we have in our homes, persons, 
and immediate possessions.58  That is, despite its protestations in Katz that 
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”59 much of the Court’s 
 
50 Id. at 353. 
51 Id. at 351. 
52 Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
53 Id. at 351–52 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted). 
54 Id. at 352 (“The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the 
petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he 
entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside.  But what he sought to exclude 
when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear.”). 
55 Id. at 353. 
56 Id. 
57 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012). 
58 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
59 389 U.S. at 351. 
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post-Katz jurisprudence has in one way or another been about charting the 
social geography of public and private spaces—a journey that often is 
difficult to navigate.60  Adding to the difficulties, the territory it has mapped 
is not composed entirely of mountains and valleys.  Rather, we find, there is 
a range of spaces in between, including cars61 and businesses,62 where we 
enjoy “diminished” expectations of privacy. 
The impact of Katz on Fourth Amendment law is not limited to 
assessing these threshold questions of search, seizure, and standing.  The 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit searches and seizures, after all, but 
rather prohibits only “unreasonable” searches and seizures.  By linking the 
Fourth Amendment to reasonable expectations of privacy rather than 
property rights, Katz provided a ready analytical structure for evaluating 
whether a search or seizure is “reasonable” that asks courts to strike a 
balance between the competing interests of law enforcement and citizens.63  
So, for example, a search conducted under the authority of a warrant issued 
by a detached and neutral magistrate, based on facts sufficient to provide 
probable cause to believe that specified evidence will be found in a 
particular home at an appointed time, is “reasonable” because the 
combination of grounded suspicion, judicial review, and particularity 
strikes a reasonable balance between law enforcement interests in detecting 
and prosecuting crime and the target’s reasonable expectations of privacy in 
his home.64  This warrant requirement also imposes broad constraints on 
law enforcement’s authority to search our homes generally, thereby 
guaranteeing a reasonable degree of security for all of us.  Similarly, the 
general requirement that officers “knock and announce” before conducting 
a warranted search reflects a reasonable balance between law enforcement’s 
interests in self-protection and preserving evidence on the one hand, and the 
privacy, safety, and property interests of people on the premises at the time 
on the other.65 
The general approach of assessing Fourth Amendment search, seizure, 
standing, and reasonableness by focusing on competing interests of citizens 
and law enforcement has produced a series of important doctrines.  Two are 
paramount for present purposes: the public-observation doctrine and the 
third-party doctrine.  The public-observation doctrine holds that law 
 
60 See Kerr, Mosaic, supra note 19. 
61 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 305 (1999). 
62 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967). 
63 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (“We must balance the nature and 
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the 
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”). 
64 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948). 
65 Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934–36 (1995). 
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enforcement can freely make observations from any place where they 
lawfully have a right to be.66  The rationale underlying this rule derives 
directly from Katz, where the Court maintained that we have no reason to 
expect privacy in activities “knowingly expose[d] to the public.”67  Because 
observations made from a public place do not implicate citizens’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy, law enforcement officers have unfettered discretion 
to pursue their interests in detecting and prosecuting crime by any means 
that is analogous—from a Katz point of view—to standing on a street 
corner.  Applying the public-observation doctrine, the Court has held that 
police may rummage through garbage cans set out for collection,68 look 
down into our yards from public airspace,69 and monitor our comings and 
goings on public roads,70 without the need for a warrant or other judicial 
review.  That is because, in theory at least, any member of the public could 
do the same; therefore, no reasonable expectations of privacy need to be 
considered. 
The third-party doctrine holds, in essence, that the only way to keep a 
secret is not to tell anyone.  It suggests that people should reasonably expect 
that anytime they share information with a confidant they run the risk that 
the information will be shared with others.  When this occurs, we can 
complain about breaches of trust by our erstwhile confidants, but not about 
those with whom the information has been shared.  Following similar logic, 
the Court has ruled that the Fourth Amendment cannot save us from ill-
placed trust if those with whom we share private information pass it along 
to law enforcement.71  Applying this rule, the Court has held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the government from using lawful means to 
gain access to privately recorded conversations,72 “pen registers” of 
telephone calls kept by telephone companies,73 or lists of financial 
transactions kept by financial institutions.74  Here again, law enforcement’s 
discretion to gather and use information from third parties is not constrained 
by the Fourth Amendment because there are no competing privacy interests 
that require accommodation.75 
 
66 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989). 
67 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
68 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988). 
69 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986). 
70 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983). 
71 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). 
72 Id. at 749–50. 
73 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). 
74 California Banker’s Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52 (1974). 
75 The limited reach of the Fourth Amendment does not bar the political branches from 
setting limits on the flow of information from third parties to law enforcement.  In fact, 
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As we shall see in Parts III and IV, the public-observation and the 
third-party doctrines play a critical role in law enforcement’s efforts to 
detect and prosecute many crimes, particularly cybercrimes.  That is 
important because these doctrines appear to be under threat after the Court’s 
decision in United States v. Jones. 
In Jones, an interagency group of law enforcement officers associated 
with an FBI–Metropolitan Police Department Task Force was investigating 
Lawrence Maynard and Antoine Jones on suspicion that they were part of a 
conspiracy to import, process, and distribute narcotics in and around the 
District of Columbia.76  During the course of their investigation, officers 
obtained warrants to tap Jones’s and Maynard’s phones as well as a warrant 
that permitted them to install and monitor a GPS-enabled tracking device on 
Jones’s automobile.77  Surveillance conducted over the next four weeks 
using the wiretap and the GPS device was productive, providing 
investigators with several incriminating statements and over 2,000 pages of 
information documenting Jones’s regular visits to stash houses and other 
locations tied to the broader drug conspiracy.78 
At trial, Jones moved to suppress evidence gathered using the GPS-
enabled tracking device.  His principal argument was that the officers failed 
to abide by the terms of the warrant.79  Relying on the public-observation 
doctrine, the trial court denied Jones’s motion.  The vast majority of what 
the GPS device gathered was information documenting Jones’s travels over 
public roads.80  Because this was information that he knowingly revealed to 
the public, the court reasoned that Jones lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  Although the officers had violated the terms of their warrant when 
installing the GPS device, the court ruled that no warrant was required in 
the first place because the surveillance conducted using the device did not 
implicate any of the privacy interests that the warrant requirement is 
designed to accommodate.81  That the officers violated the terms of the 
 
Congress has passed laws protecting financial information shared with banks, phone records, 
and even video rental histories.  Existing Federal Privacy Laws, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & 
TECH., https://www.cdt.org/privacy/guide/protect/laws.php (last visited May 21, 2013).  The 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments limit law enforcement’s ability to obtain coerced 
confessions that defendants admitted to third parties.  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 
288 (1991). 
76 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id.  The warrant required that the device be installed within ten days, but it was 
installed on the eleventh day.  The warrant also required that the device be installed within 
the borders of the District of Columbia, but it was installed in a Maryland parking lot. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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warrant was therefore of no constitutional consequence. 
The trial court’s reasoning in Jones was well-grounded in post-Katz 
doctrine, particularly the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Knotts.82  There, the Court was asked to determine whether law 
enforcement’s use of a radio beeper tracking device to monitor the public 
movements of a suspect under investigation for alleged participation in a 
drug conspiracy constituted a “search” for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.83  Affirming its commitment to the public-observation 
doctrine, the Court held that it did not.84  Although the beeper device 
allowed the officers in Knotts to track their suspect over city streets, even 
after they lost visual contact, the Court found that “scientific enhancement 
of this sort raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would 
not also raise,” which is to say it raises none at all.85  The factual parallels 
between the two cases appeared to the trial court in Jones to put the 
question before it on all fours with the holding in Knotts.86  Although the 
GPS-enabled tracking device used in Jones provided more precise 
information and required less human engagement than the radio beeper 
device used in Knotts, the information revealed was the same: movements 
knowingly exposed to public view, to which, the court concluded, Jones 
had no more reasonable claim of privacy than did Knotts. 
Based in part on the information generated using the GPS-enabled 
tracking device, Jones was convicted.87  He appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where he found a 
sympathetic audience for his Fourth Amendment concerns.88  Writing for a 
three-judge panel, Judge Ginsburg focused not on the nature of the GPS 
surveillance, or the precise type of information gathered at any given 
moment, but instead on the length of the surveillance and the quantity of 
information gathered by law enforcement using the GPS-enabled tracking 
device.89  Distinguishing Knotts, Judge Ginsburg explained that “a person 
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares [may have] no 
 
82 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
83 Id. at 277. 
84 Id. at 285 (“We thus return to the question posed at the beginning of our inquiry in 
discussing Katz, supra; did monitoring the beeper signals complained of by respondent 
invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on his part?  For the reasons previously stated, 
we hold it did not.  Since it did not, there was neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the 
contemplation of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
85 Id. at 285. 
86 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
87 Id. at 949. 
88 Id. 
89 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another,” but that does not mean that he “has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements whatsoever, world without end.”90  Rather, the 
court argued, he retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of 
his movements over an extended period of time to the extent that the 
aggregate of those moments reveals “an intimate picture of his life.”91   
Drawing specific links to the Katz framework, Judge Ginsburg argued 
that “the whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not 
actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe 
all those movements is effectively nil.”92  Relying on this “mosaic theory” 
of Fourth Amendment privacy, the circuit court therefore held that Jones 
had a “[reasonable] expectation of privacy in his movements over the 
course of a month,” even if he had no such expectation of privacy in the 
constitutive particulars.93  Because the officers who installed and monitored 
the GPS device gathered information on Jones’s movements for nearly a 
month, and without lawful authority of a warrant issued on probable cause 
by a detached and neutral magistrate, the court vacated Jones’s conviction. 
Much to the surprise of many Court watchers, the Supreme Court 
affirmed.94  Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Scalia deferred 
consideration of the circuit court’s mosaic theory95 and focused instead on 
the installation of the GPS device on Jones’s car.  In the majority’s view, 
merely installing the device constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, not because it violated subjectively manifested expectations of 
 
90 Id. at 557. 
91 Id. at 562; see also id. at 562 (“The difference is not one of degree, but of kind, for no 
single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the 
life and a way of life, nor the departure from a routine that, like the dog that did not bark in 
the Sherlock Holmes story, may reveal even more.”); id. at 563 (“[P]rolonged GPS 
monitoring reveals an intimate picture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to have—
short perhaps of his spouse.”). 
92 Id. at 558; see also id. at 563 (“A reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor 
and retain a record of every time he drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, 
and each place he stops and how long he stays there; rather, he expects each of those 
movements to remain ‘disconnected and anonymous.’”) (citation omitted).  In an analogous 
way, state harassment laws and privacy tort law have reinforced the notion that people can 
expect to be free from unreasonable surveillance.  See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 
998–99 (2d Cir. 1973) (upholding injunction of a persistent paparazzo); Wolfson v. Lewis, 
924 F. Supp. 1413, 1420, 1433–34 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (enjoining surveillance of a family on the 
grounds it was part of “a persistent course of hounding, harassment and unreasonable 
surveillance, even if conducted in a public or semi-public place”). 
93 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
94 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
95 Id. (“We may have to grapple with these ‘vexing problems’ in some future case where 
a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there 
is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.”). 
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privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, but because it 
entailed a trespass for the purpose of obtaining information.96  Surveying 
major Fourth Amendment cases since Katz, Justice Scalia found the 
reported death of the trespass principles underlying Olmstead 97 were 
exaggerated.98  Rather than displacing the traditional trespass approach to 
the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia found that the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test was an edifice built upon common law 
foundations.99  Although it was necessary to appeal to those additional 
protections in Katz, and to chart the limits of those extensions in cases like 
Knotts, the facts before the Court in Jones simply did not require anything 
more than a trespass analysis.100  Because the officers trespassed upon 
Jones’s property for the purpose of obtaining information, the Court held 
that they engaged in a search.101  Because that search was neither authorized 
by a warrant nor otherwise justified by established standards of Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness, the majority sustained the circuit court’s 
judgment, if not its holding.102 
The Jones majority’s revitalization of the trespass approach to defining 
Fourth Amendment search and seizure was headline-worthy by itself, but 
the front-page stories came from the two concurring opinions, which 
together represent the views of a voting majority of five Justices.   
Although she joined the majority, Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate 
concurrence in Jones to express her broad sympathies for the privacy 
interests that would be afforded Fourth Amendment protection by the 
circuit court’s mosaic theory.103  As she explained, long-term GPS 
monitoring, such as was conducted in Jones, “generates a precise, 
 
96 Id.; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“[W]hen the Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally 
protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment . . . .”).  Judge Kavanaugh proposed trespass as a narrower ground for 
decision in his dissent from the circuit court’s denial of the petition for rehearing en banc.  
See United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769–71 (2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
97 United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“We conclude that the underpinnings 
of Olmstead . . . have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine 
there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.”). 
98 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–54.  We allude here to Mark Twain’s famous comments on 
newspaper reports of his death. 
99 Id. at 952 (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not 
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”). 
100 Id. at 954. 
101 Id. at 949 (“The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information.  We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been 
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”). 
102 Id. at 954. 
103 Id. at 954–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth 
of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”104  In addition to its power, Justice Sotomayor noted that GPS 
monitoring comes “at a relatively low cost,” and that leaving the 
Government with “unfettered discretion” to track whomever it chooses is a 
recipe for abuse.105  Under such a regime of constant surveillance, Justice 
Sotomayor worried that the reality, or the threat, “that the Government may 
be watching [would] chill[] associational and expressive freedoms,” and 
“alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is 
inimical to democratic society.”106 
Justice Sotomayor acknowledged, as did the circuit court, that 
adopting the mosaic theory would require abandoning or modifying the 
public-observation doctrine.107  She went further, however, by suggesting 
that implementing the mosaic theory might also require the Court to 
“reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”108  According 
to Justice Sotomayor, the third-party doctrine “is ill suited to the digital age, 
in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third 
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”109  In particular, 
“[p]eople disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular 
providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which 
they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, 
and medications they purchase to online retailers.”110  Attaching her 
concerns to the Katz framework, Justice Sotomayor concluded: 
I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure 
to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or 
month, or year.  But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain 
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases 
to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.111 
In a separate concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
and Kagan, Justice Alito also expressed significant sympathy for the circuit 
court’s mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy.112  Like Justice 
Sotomayor, Justice Alito simply could not see why the public-observation 
 
104 Id. at 955. 
105 Id. at 956. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 




112 Id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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doctrine should survive without significant modification given the 
government’s dramatically expanded surveillance capacities.  “In the pre-
computer age,” he notes, “the greatest protections of privacy were neither 
constitutional nor statutory, but practical.”113  It was nearly impossible, or at 
least prohibitively expensive, for law enforcement to engage in the kind of 
continuous, long-term surveillance to which Jones was subjected.114  We 
could therefore rest assured that the government was not watching all of us 
constantly, or even very many of us at any given time.115  Justice Alito 
therefore would have held that “short-term monitoring of a person’s 
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our 
society has recognized as reasonable,” but that “longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
privacy.”116 
Together, the concurring opinions in Jones represent a majority of 
sitting Justices who appear to be willing to adopt some version of the 
mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy.  Doing so would, as these 
Justices recognize, require abandoning or modifying both the public-
observation doctrine and the third-party doctrine.117  This possibility has 
sent tremors through the community of those interested in Fourth 
Amendment issues, including law enforcement officers.  That is because 
many widely used, and often critical, investigative technologies, methods, 
and strategies that have until now operated outside of Fourth Amendment 
regulations may soon be subject to Fourth Amendment controls.  Although 
the Fourth Amendment would not necessarily bar GPS tracking and other 
surveillance technologies, methods, and strategies that implicate reasonable 
expectations of privacy in informational mosaics, it will impose limits on 
their use by requiring courts to balance the competing interests of law 
enforcement in detecting and prosecuting crime, and citizens’ interests in 
privacy.118  As we look towards that future, it is important to have a clear 
 
113 Id. at 963. 
114 Id. at 964; see also Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology 
and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 455–56 (2007). 
115 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Hutchins, 
supra note 114, at 455–56. 
116 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Stephen E. 
Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth 
Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 547–48 (2005). 
117 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
118 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that long-term use of GPS-
enabled tracking technology would require a warrant issued by a detached and neutral 
magistrate based upon probable cause); Jason M. Weinstein, Public Safety and Online 
Privacy—Myth Versus Reality, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 33, 38–39 (2013). 
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understanding of what those competing interests are.  The Jones 
concurrences, and their cadres of supporters, have done a great deal to focus 
attention on the privacy interests that would sit on one side of that scale.119  
The counterbalancing governmental interests at stake have received far less 
attention, however.  This is particularly true for many cybercrimes, which 
are relatively new, increasingly complex, and often unfamiliar to citizens 
who have not been victims.  In the next two Parts, we begin to remedy that 
omission by highlighting the significant law enforcement interests at stake 
in healthcare fraud and cyberharassment. 
III. THE GOVERNMENT’S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN PREVENTING, 
DETECTING, AND PROSECUTING HEALTHCARE FRAUD 
Should the Court eventually hold that citizens have reasonable 
expectations of privacy in mosaics of personal information, it will then need 
to provide some guidance to law enforcement, legislatures, and lower courts 
on the impact of the mosaic theory on the Court’s core Fourth Amendment 
balancing test and on well-settled doctrinal rules like the public-observation 
doctrine and the third-party doctrine.  In this Part, we explore the role that 
investigative techniques and technologies that are likely to trigger mosaic 
theory concerns play in advancing legitimate governmental interests in 
preventing, detecting, and prosecuting healthcare fraud. 
A. BIG DATA AND THE MOSAIC THEORY 
Data-collection capabilities are increasing at an unprecedented rate.120  
Not surprisingly, government agencies that investigate criminal offenses 
seek as much access to data as possible.  Cell phone carriers recently 
reported that law enforcement agencies from all levels of government 
submitted at least 1.3 million requests for user data in 2011.121  Some of the 
carriers are so overwhelmed by such requests that they are outsourcing the 
responses to third parties.122  In March 2012, journalist James Bamford, 
relying on anonymous governmental sources, reported that NSA was 
building a massive data-collection and storage center in Utah.123  According 
 
119 We are certainly among them.  See Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra 
note 7. 
120 See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private 
Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 246–47 (2007) (describing 
the recent advances and comparing to past rate of growth). 
121 Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
2012, at A1. 
122 Id. (“The outside provider, Neustar, said it handled law enforcement compliance for 
about 400 phone and Internet companies.”). 
123 James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch What 
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to Bamford: 
Flowing through its servers and routers and stored in near-bottomless databases will 
be all forms of communication, including the complete contents of private emails, cell 
phone calls, and Google searches, as well as all sorts of personal data trails—parking 
receipts, travel itineraries, bookstore purchases, and other digital “pocket litter.”124   
NSA is not alone.  Around the same time the Utah center was raising 
concerns, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) obtained 
discretionary access to nearly all data collected by the federal government, 
including, but not limited to, information on “every airline passenger 
entering the U.S.,” federally backed mortgage recipients’ financial data, and 
Veterans Affairs medical records.125  NCTC hopes to analyze the data in 
order to detect patterns that indicate terrorist activity.126 
As these programs show, the federal government collects and analyzes 
sizable amounts of data for a variety of purposes, from the administration of 
public benefits to the administration of the census.  Healthcare-related data 
is a prominent part of the mix.  For example, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires “any federally conducted or supported 
health care or public health program, activity or survey (including Current 
Population Surveys and American Community Surveys conducted by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of the Census) [to] collect[] and 
report [to Health and Human Services (DHHS)], to the extent practicable” 
patient-reported information on sex, race, ethnicity, language, disability, 
gender identity, and sexual orientation.127  DHHS will, in turn, aggregate 
and analyze “quality and resource use measures from information systems 
used to support health care delivery”128 and release to qualified private or 
public entities “standardized extracts” of Medicare Part A, B, and D claims 
 
You Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012, 7:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/
ff_nsadatacenter/. 
124 Id.  Bamford concluded that the new Utah center would be “the realization of the 
‘total information awareness’ program.”  Id.  Bamford’s accusations prompted a 
congressional investigation and interview of NSA’s chief, who denied the accusations, but 
Bamford points to both insider information and unique NSA definitions of words like 
“intercept” to support his original report.  James Bamford, NSA Chief Denies Domestic 
Spying but Whistleblowers Say Otherwise, WIRED (Mar. 21, 2012, 2:37 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/nsa-whistleblower/all/. 
125 Julia Angwin, U.S. Terror Agency to Tap Citizen Files, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2012, at 
A1. 
126 Charlie Savage, U.S. Eases Rule on Use of Data on Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 
2012, at A1 (“Moreover, the first two tracks for searching the databases that remain under 
the control of the original agencies prohibit ‘pattern analysis.’  But that restriction does not 
apply to databases the center has copied.”). 
127 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3101, 124 
Stat. 119, 578 (2010). 
128 Id. § 10305, 124 Stat. at 939. 
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for purposes of “performance measurement.”129  Pursuant to the ACA, 
DHHS is authorized to expand the types of information it collects.130 
Outside the provisions of the ACA, DHHS and Medicare programs 
also collect data from contracted intermediaries, such as the private 
insurance companies that manage claim reviews, and from Quality 
Improvement Organizations (QIOs), which are typically private 
nonprofits.131  In addition to supplying data, QIOs assist providers who 
participate in the Electronic Record Health Incentive Program, which 
requires reporting clinical quality measures like “health outcomes, clinical 
processes, patient safety, efficient use of healthcare resources, care 
coordination, patient engagements, population and public health, and 
clinical guidelines.”132  Hospitals also provide the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) with patient survey information, readmission 
statistics, and nosocomial infection data.133  More recently, DHHS 
announced a data-sharing partnership with the nation’s leading private 
insurance providers.134 
The amount of personal information, including health information, 
aggregated by government agencies, is referred to as “Big Data,” and for 
good reason.  Federal agencies, state authorities, and their private 
contractors store mind-boggling amounts of information.  Given the 
quantity and scope of this information, there can be no doubt that Big Data 
implicates privacy interests recognized by the mosaic theory of Fourth 
Amendment privacy endorsed to varying degrees by the concurring 
opinions in Jones.135  As the mosaic theory suggests, aggregations of rather 
 
129 Id. § 10332, 124 Stat. at 968.  The Secretary of HHS determines the format of the 
released data and is responsible for protecting beneficiary privacy.  Id. 
130 Id. § 6504, 124 Stat. at 776–77 (adding “data elements from the automated data 
system that the Secretary determines to be necessary for program integrity, program 
oversight, and administration, at such frequency as the Secretary shall determine” to the 
information a State must provide to receive reimbursement for maintaining automated data 
systems under 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2006)). 
131 Quality Improvement Organizations, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/Quality
ImprovementOrgs/index.html (last modified May 20, 2013). 
132 Clinical Quality Measures, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Clinical
QualityMeasures.html (last modified Apr. 4, 2013). 
133 Data Sources, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/HospitalCompare/Data/
AboutData/Data-Sources.aspx (last visited May 25, 2013). 
134 Press Release, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Obama Administration Announces 
Ground-Breaking Public-Private Partnership to Prevent Health Care Fraud (July 26, 2012), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/07/20120726a.html. 
135 See, e.g., Danielle Citron, Big Data Brokers as Fiduciaries, CONCURRING OPINIONS 
(June 19, 2012, 5:08 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/06/big-data-
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innocuous information may “reveal[] more—sometimes a great deal 
more—than does the sum of its parts.”136  This is a particularly likely 
prospect given Big Data’s use of increasingly sophisticated analytics, which 
promise to reveal far more about us than is disclosed by the raw bits and 
bytes, no matter how “big” or small the data.137  The dangers are yet more 
pronounced if health-related data is part of the mix because of what this 
information can reveal about the most intimate of our affairs.138 
Healthcare data, by definition, contains information that the Supreme 
Court has already ruled fundamentally private, such as reproductive 
choice,139 and information that the Court may deem private in the near 
future, such as genetic data.140  But not all healthcare data is protected.  In 
Whalen v. Roe, the Court found no threat to privacy in a law that required 
physicians to report to the Department of Health personal and identifying 
information of patients who were prescribed certain drugs.141  Because the 
required disclosure was similar to existing and essential procedures, like 
mandatory child abuse reporting or sharing information with insurance 
companies for reimbursement,142 and the statute provided adequate security 
against data breach, the Court held that any risk to patient privacy was 
 
brokers-as-fiduciaries.html (describing some of the dangers of Big Data for citizens). 
136 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
137 See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=0 (recounting how Target uses publicly available databases and market analytics to 
identify women who are in the early stages of pregnancy). 
138 Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955–56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(pointing out how GPS-enabled surveillance is capable of painting detailed pictures of 
subjects’ private lives when they reveal information such as “‘trips to the psychiatrist, the 
plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center’” (quoting People v. Weaver, 
909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009))). 
139 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding that a law 
forbidding contraception was an unacceptable invasion of marital privacy).  In criticizing the 
contraception law, the Griswold Court touched on the issue of police investigation, 
remarking, “Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms 
for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?  The very idea is repulsive to the notions of 
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”  Id. 
140 See, e.g., David Kravets, Pivotal DNA Privacy Case Gets Supreme Court Hearing, 
WIRED (Nov. 9, 2012, 4:57 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/11/scotus-grants-
dna-case/ (reporting that the Court has decided to hear King v. State, 42 A.3d 549 (Md. 
2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), a case in which the suspect was required to give 
a DNA sample upon arrest, which later led to a conviction for another crime). 
141 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1977).  The reporting form included the name 
of “the prescribing physician; the dispensing pharmacy; the drug and dosage; and the name, 
address, and age of the patient.”  Id. at 593. 
142 Id. at 602 & n.29. 
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insufficient to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.143  In so holding, 
however, the Court hinted that, absent adequate security measures, 
government acquisition or disclosure of massive amounts of private data 
would implicate privacy protections.144  In his concurrence, Justice Brennan 
did more than hint, suggesting that it may be necessary to restrain 
technological advancements that make such data accumulations possible.145 
A little over ten years later, the Court again considered privacy issues 
relating to data aggregation, this time in the form of rap sheets.146  Although 
the individual criminal events that compose a rap sheet may be public 
record, the Court held that the rap sheet, as a summary of the total criminal 
events in an individual’s life, represented a potential and “substantial”147 
threat to privacy,148 particularly because of advances in technology that 
allowed for greater storage capacity.149  Unlike in Whalen, where the Court 
emphasized the routine disclosure of confidential information under specific 
but frequent circumstances, the Court in U.S. Department of Justice v. 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press took pains to illustrate the 
very limited and considered means by which a third party can access rap 
sheet data.150  Additionally, the Court dismissed the argument that the 
 
143 Id. at 603–04.  The Court also refused to find any violation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment because, the cases cited, unlike in Whalen, “involve[d] affirmative, 
unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions into individual privacy during the course of 
criminal investigations.”  Id. at 604 n.32. 
144 Id. at 605–06. 
145 Id. at 606–07 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
146 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 
752 (1989) (“Rap sheets compiled pursuant to such authority contain certain descriptive 
information, such as date of birth and physical characteristics, as well as a history of arrests, 
charges, convictions, and incarcerations of the subject. . . .  [T]hey are sometimes incorrect 
or incomplete and sometimes contain information about other persons with similar names.”). 
147 Id. at 771. 
148 See id. at 764 (“Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records that 
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police 
stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single 
clearinghouse of information.”). 
149 Id. at 771 (“The substantial character of that interest is affected by the fact that in 
today’s society the computer can accumulate and store information that would otherwise 
have surely been forgotten long before a person attains age 80, when the FBI’s rap sheets are 
discarded.”).  The Court also quoted heavily from the dissent of the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision, which warned against turning the government into a 
“clearinghouse for highly personal information.”  Id. at 761 (quoting Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 831 F.2d 1124, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, 
J., dissenting), rev’d, 489 U.S. 749 (1989)). 
150 Id. at 752 (explaining that the FBI considers rap sheets “confidential and, with certain 
exceptions, has restricted their use to governmental purposes”); id. at 753 (describing the 
three exceptions Congress created for the release of rap sheets: (1) as required by State 
licensing requirements; (2) “to self-regulatory organizations in the securities industry,” and 
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privacy interest in the sum of public events listed on a rap sheet 
“approaches zero.”151  The Court concluded that “although there is 
undoubtedly some public interest in anyone’s criminal history,” the interest 
is not central to the government-monitoring purpose of FOIA, which is to 
allow citizens to monitor the government, not individuals.152 
Although neither of these cases implicated the Fourth Amendment, 
they involved personal data similar or identical to that which is currently 
being collected and stored as part of Big Data projects.  Accordingly, they 
incorporate key factors the Court may use to decide whether large quantities 
of aggregated healthcare data can trigger privacy concerns.  Among these 
seem to be the extent to which disclosure is commonplace, whether the data 
is aggregated or dispersed, and the intent of the law authorizing collection 
or release.  The last factor is crucial as it relates to Big Data.  The stated 
intent of the ACA is quite broad, ranging from quality control to fraud 
prevention to cost containment.153  By giving researchers, law enforcement, 
and administrators access to large amounts of information, Big Data could 
conceivably be used for all three purposes and more. 
As we pointed out in Part II, the fact that contemporary surveillance 
technology, including data-aggregation technology and sophisticated 
analytics deployed as part of “Big Data,” may constitute a Fourth 
Amendment “search” does not mean that the government and its agents 
should be denied all access.  Rather, what the Fourth Amendment demands 
is a balancing of legitimate governmental interests served by Big Data with 
the privacy interests threatened by Big Data.  To this point, most of the 
academic articles and journalistic exposés on Big Data have focused on the 
second half of that equation.  In the remainder of this Part, we draw 
attention to one important weight on the government’s side of the scale: 
efforts to prevent, detect, and prosecute healthcare fraud. 
B. THE VALUE OF BIG DATA IN COMBATING HEALTHCARE FRAUD 
Any reasonable discussion of healthcare fraud must include Medicare.  
Medicare is a government health insurance program for the elderly and the 
disabled.154  Every day, 4.5 million claims for Medicare services are 
 
(3) for “licensees or applicants before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission”). 
151 Id. at 763. 
152 Id. at 774. 
153 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1313, 
3001, 124 Stat 119, 184, 353 (2010). 
154 What Is Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/
decide-how-to-get-medicare/whats-medicare/what-is-medicare.html (last visited May 21, 
2013).  
2013] FIGHTING CYBERCRIME 771 
processed.155  In 2011, the program covered almost 49 million people, 
spending over $500 billion.156  The extent of Medicare fraud is unknown,157 
but it is believed to cost the government somewhere between $60 billion 
and $90 billion a year.158  Hospitalization claims are the most common 
source of civil fraud investigations, while outpatient, medical equipment, 
and lab work claims are the most common sources of criminal fraud 
investigations.159  Home-health agencies and providers of durable medical 
equipment have particularly high fraud rates.160 
Healthcare fraud generally—and Medicare fraud in particular—
frequently involves health providers’ charging for services never provided, 
billing for unnecessary equipment, stealing medical identities, paying 
kickbacks for referrals, or using a Medicare number for fraudulent billing.  
Complex schemes often incorporate a mix of strategies.161  To identify 
 
155 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
REPORT TO CONGRESS: FRAUD PREVENTION SYSTEM—FIRST IMPLEMENTATION YEAR 11 
(2012), available at http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/fraud-rtc12142012.pdf; Medicare 
Advantage Plans, MEDICARE.GOV., http://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/medicare
-health-plans/medicare-advantage-plans/medicare-advantage-plans.html (last visited May 21, 
2013); What Is Medicare?, supra note 154 (explaining that Part C is the Medicare 
Advantage Program, which is a managed care system for individuals with both Part A and 
Part B; Part D is the optional prescription program). 
156 How Is Medicare Funded?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/about-us/how-
medicare-is-funded/medicare-funding.html (last visited May 21, 2013).  With an enrollment 
of about sixty million people, Medicaid covers more individuals, yet Medicare expenditures 
were over $150 billion more than Medicaid expenditures.  Medicaid Information by Topic, 
MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/
By-Topic.html (last visited May 21, 2013); NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet.html (last modified Jan. 9, 
2013). 
157 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-213T, TYPES OF PROVIDERS INVOLVED 
IN MEDICARE CASES, AND CMS EFFORTS TO REDUCE FRAUD 1 (2012) (testimony of Kathleen 
M. King, Director, Health Care, before the H. Subcomm. on Health, Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce) [hereinafter GAO-13-213T]. 
158 Kennedy, supra note 15. 
159 GAO-13-213T, supra note 157, at 3–5 (2012) (“According to 2010 data, about one-
quarter of the 7,848 subjects investigated in criminal health care fraud cases were medical 
facilities or were affiliated with these facilities.  Additionally, about 16 percent of subjects 
were durable medical equipment suppliers. . . .  Hospitals constituted nearly 20 percent of 
the 2,339 subjects of civil fraud cases investigated in 2010, and other medical facilities 
accounted for about 18 percent of the subjects.”). 
160 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-801T, MEDICARE: PROGRESS MADE 
TO DETER FRAUD, BUT MORE COULD BE DONE 4 (2012) (testimony of Kathleen M. King, 
Director, Health Care, before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce) (illustrating the weaknesses; GAO successfully created two fake 
DME providers). 
161 M.B. Pell, AJC Investigation: Mailbox Medical Schemes on Rise: Medicare Fraud 
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fraudulent billing practices, automated systems help investigators flag 
impossible claims, such as a provider’s alleged removal of twenty toenails 
from three toes or bills for more therapy sessions than Newtonian physics 
would allow.162  Phantom billing may involve elaborate schemes in which 
there are in fact no physical clinics, patients, or health practitioners.  For 
example, a member of an Armenian organized crime group recently 
admitted to creating a network of clinics and providers that existed only on 
paper, but nevertheless billed Medicare for nearly $100 million and 
received over $35 million in payments.163 
Similar to phantom billing is billing for services that are not medically 
necessary.  In one case, a doctor with a penchant for Playboy models and 
Picassos received “$1.2 million from Medicare in 2008 . . . a large portion 
of it from physical therapy,” consisting of “heat packs, massage, electrical 
stimulation and ultrasound.”164  Although government-funded massages are 
relatively harmless to patients, other unnecessary treatments can be invasive 
and life threatening.  In a recent case, investigators discovered that patients 
who were disoriented and unable to control their bodily functions were 
being forced to attend group therapy that served no medical purpose.165  
 
Costs Taxpayers, but Agency Claims It’s Hard to Stop, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 2, 2012, at 
A1 (examining the process scammers use to steal providers’ identities and set up phony 
clinics with post office boxes); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of Cal., Third 
Physician Sentenced to Lengthy Prison Sentence in Medicare Fraud Case (Oct. 24, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/cae/news/docs/2012/10-2012/10-24-12Prakash
Sent.html (highlighting a medical office that paid beneficiaries to use their Medicare 
numbers to bill for phantom services where “[f]ew of these tests were ever performed, none 
were performed based on any medical need, and clinic employees filled out other portions of 
the charts using preprinted templates” and “[s]ome clinic employees admitted to performing 
various tests on themselves, and placing the results in patient files”). 
162 Mark Schoofs & Maurice Tamman, Confidentiality Cloaks Medicare Abuse, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 22, 2010, at A1 (“A physical therapist in Brooklyn . . . billed for so much 
therapy—more than $2.5 million in 2008 alone—that it would have been virtually 
impossible for him to have performed it all within state and Medicare guidelines . . . .”); see 
also Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health 
Information 48, 52 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (explaining that a 
doctor’s billing specialists would “upcode” by billing for time not spent directly with the 
patient, resulting in daily billings that exceeded 24 hours). 
163 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Leader of $100 Million 
Medicare Fraud Scheme Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to Racketeering and 
Other Crimes (Oct. 26, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/
October12/MirzoyanDavitPleaPR.php. 
164 Schoofs & Tamman, supra note 162 (explaining that, despite the unusually limited 
scope of his treatments, a doctor’s Medicare earnings were “more than 24 times the 
Medicare income of the average family doctor, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of 
Medicare-claims data” and that he closed his practice after Medicare began denying his 
claims and worked at a pain management clinic at the time the article was published). 
165 Warren Richey, US Agents Make Arrests in Massive Medicare Fraud Case in 
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Providers altered their records so it would appear that patients benefited 
from therapy that was anything but helpful.166  In another case, the 
government alleged that a nursing home required therapists to use the most 
expensive treatments on residents, even if the interventions were 
inappropriate or dangerous.167  For example, it alleged that a ninety-two-
year-old cancer patient in Orlando, who was routinely spitting up blood, 
nonetheless received 48 minutes of physical therapy, 47 minutes of 
occupational therapy, and 30 minutes of speech therapy, two days before 
his death.  The day he died, the patient received 35 minutes of physical 
therapy and was scheduled for more therapy later in the day.168  CMS 
reported a dermatologist who, in addition to unnecessarily removing 
“benign skin lesions,” reused sutures, thereby exposing patients to HIV, 
hepatitis C, and other diseases.169 
Claims for medical equipment are another common target for 
fraudsters.  Two Los Angeles pastors recently were found guilty of running 
separate schemes involving power wheelchairs.  In the first, the 
conspirators purchased fraudulent medical documentation and billed 
Medicare $6,000 for power wheelchairs that actually cost $900.170  The 
conspirators also offered wheelchairs and other unnecessary equipment to 
Medicare beneficiaries in exchange for their Medicare numbers.171  If 
Medicare refused to pay for the chairs, the pastor instructed his employees 
to take the chairs away from the beneficiaries.172  The funds from the 
scheme were diverted among sham supply companies run by the pastor’s 
wife and other church members.173  A second pastor and a doctor who 
 
Florida, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 21, 2010, at 8 (“‘Employees who failed to cooperate 
or participate in the fraud were terminated,’ the [court] documents say.  ‘One ATC employee 
was fired after she discharged several beneficiaries she felt were not eligible . . . due to their 
mental state.’  The records say a senior manager later readmitted those same beneficiaries.”).  
The owner of the company is currently serving a 50-year sentence, “the stiffest Medicare-
fraud punishment in history.”  Jay Weaver, Women Convicted of Medicare Fraud at Fort 
Lauderdale Therapy Clinic, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/
2012/11/19/3105498/women-convicted-of-medicare-fraud.html. 
166 Richey supra note 165; Weaver, supra note 165. 




169 Medicare Advantage Plans, supra note 155, at 33. 
170 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Los Angeles Church 
Pastor Sentenced to Serve 36 Months in Prison for $14.2 Million Medicare Fraud Scheme 
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provided fraudulent documentation pleaded guilty to running a similar 
conspiracy later in the same year.174 
Prescription medicines provide another rich territory for healthcare 
fraud.  A well-known dialysis provider was accused in 2012 of intentionally 
wasting medication by giving multiple partial doses, instead of smaller 
numbers of full doses, in order to inflate charges.175  Later that same year, a 
Miami pharmacy owner pleaded guilty to fraud charges for instructing his 
employees to retrieve from assisted-living facilities unused medication 
already billed to Medicare and Medicaid so that it could be repackaged and 
reused.176  The repackaged medicine was distributed to other assisted-living 
facilities or the general public and resubmitted to insurance.177  The 
pharmacist also paid assisted-living facilities to refer residents.178  In 
Baltimore, a pharmacist admitted to purchasing drums of drugs from an 
unlicensed provider, mislabeling them, and dispensing them to 
customers.179  The same pharmacist submitted claims to Medicare for 
prescription refills that were not dispensed to beneficiaries.180  Still another 
pharmacist admitted to paying Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries for 
their prescriptions and then submitting reimbursement claims to insurance 
companies without dispensing the medication.181  Among his targets were 
 
174 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Los Angeles-Area 
Church Pastor Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering and Conspiring with Doctors, Others to 
Defraud Medicare of More than $11 Million (Dec. 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1506.html. 
175 Scott Bronstein & Drew Griffin, Dialysis Company Accused of Giant Medicare 
Fraud, CNN.COM (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/30/health/medicare-fraud-
case/index.html. 
176 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Pharmacy Owner Pleads 
Guilty in Miami for Role in $23 Million Health Care Fraud Scheme (Dec. 6, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1461.html. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Md., Pharmacy Owner Sentenced to 
Over 4 Years for Health Care Fraud, Aggravated Identity Theft and Conspiracy to Misbrand 
Drugs (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/md/Public-Affairs/press_
releases/press08/PharmacyOwnerSentencedtoover4YearsforHealthCareFraudAggravatedIde
ntityTheftandConspiracy.html (“Agents recovered drugs from the pharmacies with 
expiration dates removed and others with altered labels.  Agents seized more controlled 
substances from [the pharmacist]’s home, including Oxycodone, Fentanyl, Adderall and 
Kadian, all of which were expired.”). 
180 Id. 
181 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Mass., Dorchester Pharmacist 
Convicted for Defrauding Medicare and Medicaid (July 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2011/July/McGeePleaPR.html; Press Release, U.S. 
Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Mass., Pharmacist Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Defraud 
Medicaid (Sept. 13, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2010/
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patients with HIV or mental illness, whose medications are particularly 
expensive.182 
Patients are not always innocent victims, of course.  Beneficiaries 
often participate in healthcare fraud schemes in exchange for services or 
kickbacks.183  Kickbacks range from cash184 and cigarettes185 to spa services 
and lunches.186  In a massive operation in New York, conspirators paid 
$500,000 to beneficiaries in a special “kickback room.”187  Some of these 
schemes are far more Dickensian, providing subsistence benefits, such as 
housing, to vulnerable beneficiaries and then threatening them with 
homelessness if they refuse to comply with the fraud.188  Whether through 
coercion, persuasion, or deception, individuals engaged in fraud expose 
Medicare beneficiaries, who are often ill or limited in capacity, to 
substantial risks. 
Medical identity theft is a significant problem as well.  CMS reports 
that, in 2011, a man was convicted of stealing his brother’s medical 
information and using it for surgery covered under his brother’s insurance.  
 
September/OnujioguAmadiegwuPleaPR.html. 
182 See sources cited supra note 181. 
183 The Government Accountability Office reported that about 11% of the successful 
criminal fraud prosecutions were of beneficiaries.  GAO-13-213T, supra note 157, at 4. 
184 Mark Schoofs et al., Medicare-Fraud Crackdown Corrals 114, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 
2011, at A3 (reporting that, according to the indictment, the following exchange took place 
between a provider and a beneficiary: “Beneficiary: ‘Each person I refer to you is $200 or 
$250?’  [Provider]: ‘I’m going to be honest with you.  I will give you $150.  Alright $250, 
$200.  [Expletive] I ain’t goin fifty ’cause I got to have something now, come on’”). 
185 91 Are Charged with Fraud, Billing Millions to Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2012, 
at B5 (“Some patients watched TV instead of receiving services . . . .”). 
186 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Brooklyn, N.Y., 
Physician and Clinic President Pleads Guilty to Medicare Fraud Scheme (Dec. 10, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1474.html. 
187 Jerry Markon, Justice Dept. Charges 94 People with Health-Care Fraud, WASH. 
POST, July 17, 2010, at A14; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. 
Affairs, Brooklyn, N.Y., Clinic Employee Pleads Guilty in Connection with $71 Million 
Medicare Fraud Scheme (Dec. 3, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/
December/12-crm-1436.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, 
Owner of Brooklyn Clinic Pleads Guilty in Connection with $71 Million Medicare Fraud 
Scheme (Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2012/
owner-of-brooklyn-clinic-pleads-guilty-in-connection-with-71-million-medicare-fraud-
scheme (“In total, 16 individuals have been charged in the Bay Medical scheme, including 
two doctors, nine clinic owners/operators/employees and five external money launderers.”); 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Two Brooklyn Clinic 
Employees Plead Guilty in Connection with $71 Million Medicare Fraud Scheme (Nov. 28, 
2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/November/12-crm-1419.html. 
188 Jay Weaver, Ex-Director of Miami Gardens Mental Health Clinic Imprisoned for 8 
Years for Medicare Fraud, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/
2012/12/21/3152770/ex-director-of-miami-gardens-mental.html#storylink=cpy. 
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The victim’s medical records in turn incorrectly included his brother’s HIV-
positive status, which put the true beneficiary at risk of receiving medically 
unnecessary drugs and procedures.189   
Perpetrators also steal the identities of unsuspecting providers who 
have already been approved by Medicare in order to file fraudulent 
claims.190  In one case, a home-health agency owner stopped paying his 
licensed personnel and, when they quit, billed hundreds of claims under his 
former employees’ licenses.191  Organized crime is also involved, creating 
networks of nonexistent clinics based on stolen provider information, often 
leading to suspicious claims, such as “[a] pregnant woman who gets an 
ultrasound exam—from an ear, nose and throat doctor[, a] forensic 
pathologist whose patients walked into his office, rather than being rolled in 
with toe tags[, a] dermatologist who conducted heart tests[, or a] 
psychiatrist who performed M.R.I.’s.”192 
Although some providers’ identities are stolen, others lend, rent, or sell 
their identities to facilitate fraud schemes.193  Take, for example, a case in 
New Jersey where a licensed provider was “frequently either not in the 
office at all, or was in his personal office watching television.”194  He 
provided “pre-signed, blank prescription forms” to the unlicensed 
employees who were diagnosing patients.195  In another case, unlicensed 
physicians paid a licensed physician “$2,000 a month to review and sign 
medical records prepared by physician assistants.”196 
 
189 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 155, at 34. 
190 Michael Wilson & William K. Rashbaum, Real Patients, Real Doctors, Fake 
Everything Else, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at A31 (“The scheme sidestepped the 
cumbersome element of most Medicare schemes, which typically involve pairing up a 
corrupt doctor with a complicit patient faking an injury.”). 
191 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of N.J., Toms River, New Jersey Man 
Admits Posing as a Doctor, Treating Elderly Patients in Medicare Fraud Scheme (July 11, 
2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/newark/press-releases/2011/toms-river-new-jersey-
man-admits-posing-as-a-doctor-treating-elderly-patients-in-medicare-fraud-scheme. 
192 Wilson & Rashbaum, supra note 190, at A31. 
193 Pell, supra note 161, at A1 (“Using a sham provider number and a UPS Store address, 
a scam artist can provide what looks like a real physician’s approval for unnecessary or non-
existent medical services and equipment for a company that is registered to bill Medicare.”). 
194 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of N.J., Rahway, New Jersey Man 
Admits Posing as Licensed Physician in Medicaid and Medicare Fraud Scheme (May 9, 
2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/newark/press-releases/2011/rahway-new-jersey-man-
admits-posing-as-licensed-physician-in-medicaid-and-medicare-fraud-scheme. 
195 Id. 
196 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, N. Dist. of Ill., U.S. Arrests Owners of Home 
Health Care Business and Suspended Podiatrist on Charges Alleging Medicare and Visa 
Fraud (July 20, 2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/chicago/press-releases/2011/u.s.-
arrests-owners-of-home-health-care-business-and-suspended-podiatrist-on-charges-alleging-
medicare-and-visa-fraud; see also Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, N. Dist. of Ill., 
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Healthcare fraud is increasingly accomplished and facilitated by 
electronic means.197  Rather than steal patient information on an individual 
basis, hackers target medical information databases.  In May 2012, a group 
of hackers based in Eastern Europe breached Utah’s healthcare database, 
gaining access to over 780,000 records, including Social Security numbers 
and medical diagnosis codes.198  These records are essential for fraudulent 
billing.  According to one report, “an individual healthcare record is worth 
more on the black market ($50, on average) than a U.S.-based credit card 
and personal identity with social security number combined.”199  As 
healthcare fraud moves into the digital arena, traditional methods of 
detection and prosecution are simply inadequate.  A cybercrime requires a 
cybersolution, which, in the case of healthcare fraud, will almost certainly 
include Big Data. 
C. HOW BIG DATA SERVES GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN 
PREVENTING, DETECTING, AND PROSECUTING HEALTHCARE 
FRAUD 
The overwhelming majority of data that CMS and its contractors use to 
detect fraud comes from claims, payment, and referral records.200  Now that 
 
Chicago Area Dermatologist and Psychologist Charged in Nationwide Medicare Fraud 
Strike Force Takedown (Oct. 4, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/
chicago/2012/pr1004_01.pdf (announcing that two of the defendants were convicted and a 
third pleaded guilty). 
197 Compare Cynthia M. Stamer, Cybercrime and Identity Theft: Health Information 
Security Beyond HIPAA, 1 ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (2005), available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/stamer_
right.html (explaining how healthcare identity theft is an increasing problem), and Neal 
Ungerleider, Medical Cybercrime: The Next Frontier, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 15, 2012, 3:34 
PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3000470/medical-cybercrime-next-frontier (reporting 
incidences of medical-record and medical-equipment hacking), with Lara Jakes Jordan, 38 
Charged in Phishing Scams: Consumer Data Target of Global Ring, WASH. POST, May 20, 
2008, at D3 (describing a general identity-theft operation), Cassell Bryan-Low, Identity 
Thieves Organize; Investigators See New Pattern: Criminals Team Up to Sell Stolen Data 
Over the Internet, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2005, at B1 (outlining methods of identity theft 
aimed at financial data), and Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Int’l Cyber-Fraud Ring 
Responsible for Millions of Dollars in Fraud Dismantled (Dec. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1452.html (publicizing a scheme 
wherein individuals posted fraudulent vehicle ads on websites). 
198 Common Questions, UTAH DEP’T OF HEALTH, DATA BREACH SOLUTION CTR., 
http://www.health.utah.gov/databreach/common-questions.html (last visited May 21, 2013). 
199 Keith Tyson, What’s the Market Value of a Healthcare Record?, DELL 
SECUREWORKS (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.secureworks.com/media/blog/general/market-
value-of-a-healthcare-record/; see also Cole Petrochko, DHC: EHR Data Target for Identity 
Thieves, MEDPAGE TODAY (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.medpagetoday.com/Practice
Management/InformationTechnology/30074. 
200 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 155, at 17; see also Pasquale, 
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CMS is partnering with private insurance organizations, it will have access 
to private claims and other health data.201 Additionally, the Medicare 
Integrity Manual lists a dozen types of data that contract agencies should 
use when investigating suspicious activity, including: (1) the nature of the 
providers and staff; (2) the structure of the business, overhead costs, and its 
relationship to other businesses; (3) the amount of business generally and 
the amount of business from Medicare/Medicaid reimbursements 
specifically; (4) the types of services rendered; (5) location; (6) history of 
claims and any previous investigations; and (7) “[o]ther information needed 
to explain and/or clarify the issue(s) in question.”202 
In part due to the involvement of international organized crime 
syndicates, the Department of Justice (DOJ), which investigates and 
prosecutes fraud cases, considers healthcare fraud an indicator of potential 
terrorism.203  DOJ describes healthcare providers as “nontraditional 
information gatherers [that] can provide [interagency data-sharing] fusion 
centers with both strategic and tactical information,”204 including “health 
surveillance networks [and] syndromic surveillance.”205  It recommends 
that fusion centers, which serve as hubs for local, state, and federal 
information gathering and sharing,206 collaborate with healthcare providers 
to develop analytical tools.207  Access to fusion-center networks means 
having the ability to mine and analyze vast public databases at the state, 
local, and federal level; data-broker dossiers on millions of individuals; 
 
supra note 162, at 46 (“The public-private surveillance partnerships pioneered in [HHS and 
DOJ’s] fraud fighting efforts are a model for both the first order problem of collecting and 
analyzing data and the second order problem of ‘watching the watchers’ to ensure that data 
is used properly.”); id. at 49 (describing the intergration of numerous data sources for the 
purpose of detecting fraud). 
201 Press Briefing, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the Fraud Prevention 
Partnership Announcement Event (July 26, 2012), available at http://www.stopfraud.gov/
iso/opa/stopfraud/ag-speech-120726.html. 
202 MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL 2.4(B) (rev. ed. Nov. 20, 2009), available 
at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/pim83
c02.pdf. 
203 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FUSION CENTER GUIDELINES 13 (2006), available at 
http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf (“Many 
experts believe that there is a high probability of identifying terrorists through precursor 
criminal activity, including illegal drug operations, money laundering, fraud, terrorism, and 
identity theft.”) (internal citation omitted). 
204 Id. at 17. 
205 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH SECURITY: PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL 
INTEGRATION FOR FUSION CENTERS 6 (2011), available at www.it.ojp.gov/doc
downloader.aspx?ddid=1450. 
206 State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers (last visited May 21, 2013). 
207 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note  205, at 8. 
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private databases held by cooperating entities; video streams from public 
and private cameras; and far more.  In prosecuting fraud cases, DOJ will 
have access to CMS’s data as well as any data aggregated and analyzed by 
fusion centers.  In short, efforts to prevent, detect, and prosecute healthcare 
fraud are increasingly tied to Big Data. 
Already an important tool for regulators and law enforcement, Big 
Data is likely to become a more powerful and important asset in the years to 
come.208  The ACA contains a provision requiring the release of some of 
Medicare’s billing data, which previously had been blocked by a court 
ruling citing physician privacy.209  CMS has discussed plans to leverage the 
detection benefits of Big Data to facilitate a move towards “fraud 
prevention,” rather than the former method of paying claims and later 
attempting to reclaim funds fraudulently acquired.210  To this end, CMS has 
developed multiple task forces and agencies that tap private-sector 
information technology resources.211  The most recent initiative is the Fraud 
Prevention System (FPS), a response to requirements in the Small Business 
Jobs Act of 2010 “to implement predictive analytics technologies to 
 
208 See John Carreyrou & Tom McGinty, Medicare Records Reveal Troubling Trail of 
Surgeries, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2011, at A1; Markon, supra note 187, at A14 (“In May 
2009, the administration launched a high-level task force, the Health Care Fraud Prevention 
and Enforcement Action Team, which uses electronic claims data—and the threat of federal 
prosecution—to seek out illicit billing.”); Pasquale, supra note 162, at 54 (“[I]t is important 
to recognize the successes of contractors in utilizing sophisticated data mining to fight fraud.  
While HHS and DOJ recovered $2.5 billion in 2009, they recovered more than $4 billion in 
fiscal year 2010.  The high-tech Health Care Fraud Prevention & Enforcement Action Team 
(HEAT) established by the agencies has also enhanced monitoring capacity.”); Mark 
Schoofs & Maurice Tamman, In Medicare’s Data Trove, Clues to Curing Cost Crisis, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 26, 2010, at A1 (describing the preliminary findings revealed by the Wall Street 
Journal and the nonprofit Center for Public Integrity, once they obtained a Medicare 
provider reimbursement database, and emphasizing the need for greater access to such 
information). 
209 Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Feds to Allow Use of Medicare Data to Rate Doctors, 
MINN. NPR (Dec. 5, 2011), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/12/05/feds-
allow-medicare-data-to-rate-doctors/ (“Doctors will be individually identifiable through the 
Medicare files, but personal data on their patients will remain confidential.”); see also 
Pasquale, supra note 162, at 16.  But see Robert O’Harrow, Jr, Health-Care Sector 
Vulnerable to Hackers, Researchers Say, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2012), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-25/news/36015727_1_health-care-medical-
devices-patient-care (criticizing the security provisions required by the electronic records 
program of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which was part of “the Obama 
administration’s first big step toward health-care reform”). 
210 Schoofs & Tamman, Confidentiality Cloaks Medicare Abuse, supra note 162. 
211 For an explanation of the various roles of private contractors in CMS data analysis 
and fraud detection, see Pasquale, supra note 162, at 50–52.  See also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE 
AND MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 155, at 10 (corporate partners for FPS are Northrop 
Grumman, Verizon, National Government Services, IBM, and Health Integrity). 
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identify and prevent the payment of improper claims in the Medicare fee-
for-service program.”212 
All of Medicare’s daily 4.5 million claims run through FPS’s 
“predictive algorithms and other sophisticated analytics,”213 which are 
similar to those used by credit card companies to detect fraudulent 
purchases.214  Although FPS cannot automatically stop payments, it 
“automatically generates and prioritizes leads for review and 
investigation.”215  FPS addresses the problem of data silos by analyzing 
claims nationwide216 and over a period of time,217 both of which are 
necessary for identifying fraudulent behavior.218  FPS also complements the 
Automated Provider Screening System; the two systems are now slated for 
integration.219  CMS has more plans to expand the reach and power of FPS, 
including social network analysis220 and adaptive analytics.221 
According to CMS, in 2011 “FPS also generated leads for 536 new . . . 
investigations, augmented information for 511 pre-existing investigations, 
and prompted 617 provider interviews and 1,642 beneficiary interviews to 
verify legitimate provision of Medicare services and supplies.”222  CMS 
claims that these efforts resulted in a savings of $115 million.223  Although 
modest when compared to the total of $4.1 billion that CMS recovered from 
fraud schemes through partnerships with private contractors and 
government agencies in 2011,224 the program is just getting started, and 
 
212 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 155, at ii. 
213 Id. at iv, 11. 
214 Id. at 4, 11. 
215 Id. at v, 36. 
216 Id. at 8. 
217 Id. at 36. 
218 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-104, MEDICARE FRAUD PREVENTION 
CMS HAS IMPLEMENTED A PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS SYSTEM, BUT NEEDS TO DEFINE MEASURES 
TO DETERMINE ITS EFFECTIVENESS 6 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/
649537.pdf. 
219 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 155, at 25, 37 (“The most 
effective prevention tool is revoking the billing privileges of providers who are known bad 
actors.”). 
220 Id. at vi, 18. 
221 Id. at 16. 
222 Id. at 23. 
223 See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 155, at app. A 
(DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., A-17-12-53000, THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES HAS IMPLEMENTED PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS 
TECHNOLOGIES BUT CAN IMPROVE ITS REPORTING ON RELATED SAVINGS AND RETURN ON 
INVESTMENT (2012)).  The methods CMS used to calculate the savings have been criticized. 
224 About Fraud, STOP MEDICARE FRAUD, http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/aboutfraud/
index.html (last visited May 21, 2013). 
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officials expect to prevent or recover billions of dollars in losses.225 
Even when FPS was in its infancy, the Wall Street Journal drew 
attention to suspicious providers using simple data analysis of a database 
“contain[ing] records only through 2008, and includ[ing] the claims of just 
5% of randomly selected Medicare beneficiaries.”226  In 2010, the Journal 
described the suspect practices of a physical therapist who later pleaded 
guilty to healthcare fraud.227  Among other charges, the doctor submitted a 
claim for a service that occurred while he was on vacation.228  The Journal 
used the same comparatively limited data set to identify a surgeon who was 
practicing in Texas after being temporarily banned from Medicare because 
he had performed unnecessary and harmful surgeries in New Jersey.229  The 
Journal found that the readmitted doctor’s death rate was seven times 
higher than the national average.230  Another surgeon appeared to perform 
an unusually high number of multiple spinal operations per patient.231 
Investigating these types of activities requires access to Big Data.  
With Big Data, governmental systems can identify providers who bill more 
over a specified time period than other providers in the region.  Claims 
analysis can detect providers who authorize particularly expensive 
equipment.  Analysis of individuals’ claims over time can reveal 
discrepancies or impossibilities, such as multiple hysterectomies, which 
indicate possible identity theft or kickbacks.  Looking at groups of 
individual claims could also reveal possible kickbacks if, for instance, a 
sizeable population in a community suddenly switches to a less convenient 
pharmacy.  As FPS incorporates social network models, the system will 
gain further leverage on its data, allowing it to compare individuals against 
known criminal associations, including those that work primarily in the 
 
225 HEAT Task Force, STOP MEDICARE FRAUD, http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/about
fraud/heattaskforce/index.html (last visited May 21, 2013). 
226 Schoofs & Tamman, supra note 162; see also Carreyrou & McGinty, supra note 208 
(“For the past year, the Journal has been mining Medicare’s claims databases to expose how 
some doctors potentially defraud the taxpayer-funded health program for the elderly and 
disabled and game its reimbursement system.”).  In December 2011, HHS decided to release 
more information about doctors who participate in Medicare in response to provisions in the 
Affordable Care Act.  See John Carreyrou, Access to Widen on Medicare Data, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 8, 2011, at A6. 
227 Mark Schoofs, Medicare Fraud Nets Guilty Plea, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2011, at A3. 
228 Id. 
229 Carreyrou & McGinty, supra note 208, at A16. 
230 Id. (“In 2008 and 2009, nine of 49 Medicare patients on whom he performed an 
elective surgery died, three of them within days of the operation, according to the Medicare 
data.  That equates to 18.4 deaths per 100 of the procedures, compared with a national 
average of 2.4 per 100 for the procedure.”). 
231 Id. 
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virtual world of black-market healthcare data.  The more data the system 
can use to build comparative models, the more accurately the models will 
reflect standard practice.232  As evidence of this potential, CMS recently 
credited “sophisticated data analysis” for the indictment of a home-
healthcare physician in “the biggest health-care fraud case brought against a 
single doctor.”233  The doctor certified over 5,000 patients a year for home-
healthcare by having his employees complete certification forms using his 
forged signature.234 
Although many healthcare fraud cases originate through direct 
reporting, including qui tam actions, complicated schemes like those 
involving organized crime are more vulnerable to data analysis, which can 
review and compare large volumes of claims over time.  To achieve its 
stated goal of stopping fraudulent payments before they reach the provider, 
CMS will need robust analytical tools that can probe massive quantities of 
disparate data to flag automatically suspect claims across a wide range of 
covered services and also evolve to identify new fraudulent behavior as it 
develops.  That capacity is likely to be greatly enhanced in coming years as 
CMS programs gain access to the vast quantities of consumer and other 
data currently brokered through third-party aggregators.  At each turn, the 
government and its agents will face potential Fourth Amendment barriers 
erected by the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy. 
D. STRIKING A REASONABLE BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVACY 
INTERESTS AND LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN 
PREVENTING, DETECTING, AND PROSECUTING HEALTHCARE 
FRAUD 
According to the mosaic theory, gathering the large quantities of 
information engaged by Big Data raises significant Fourth Amendment 
privacy issues—all the more so when that data is processed through 
sophisticated analytical software.  Although troubling from a privacy point 
of view, the foregoing shows that the government’s interest in Big Data is 
 
232 But see Robert Radick, Claims Data and Health Care Fraud: The Controversy 
Continues, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2012, 11:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2012/
09/25/claims-data-and-health-care-fraud-the-controversy-continues/ (criticizing reliance on 
claims data that CMS officials have admitted can be inaccurate). 
233 Sari Horwitz, Tex. Doctor Charged in $375 Million Health-Care Scam, Largest of Its 
Kind, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2012, at A1 (“[The] alleged scheme resulted in more than $350 
million being fraudulently billed to Medicare and more than $24 million to Medicaid.”). 
234 Id.  The doctor’s home also contained incriminating evidence, including “the books 
‘Hide Your Assets and Disappear: A Step-by-Step Guide to Vanishing Without a Trace,’ and 
‘The Offshore Money Manual,’ suggesting 23 worldwide locations favorable to offshore 
banking.”  Id. 
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not nefarious or idle.  Rather, it is rationally tied to legitimate regulatory 
and law enforcement interests in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting 
various forms of Medicare and healthcare fraud. 
The mosaic theory would certainly impact these legitimate 
governmental interests.  It would not, however, bar access to Big Data.  
Rather, where a law enforcement method, practice, or technology 
encroaches upon reasonable expectations of privacy, the mosaic theory will 
require that access and use be limited and constrained to effect a 
“reasonable” balance between law enforcement interests and citizens’ 
privacy interests.235  In the context of physical searches of the home, the 
warrant requirement does this work.236  But, for Big Data, the warrant 
requirement would fail to strike a reasonable balance because it would 
render the technology largely useless from the government’s point of view.  
The whole point of Big Data is, after all, to gather large quantities of data 
and to submit it to analysis without having any specific prior suspicions of 
wrongdoing by particular people.  On the other hand, granting law 
enforcement unfettered access to Big Data and its products would 
effectively leave unrecognized and unprotected important quantitative 
privacy interests.  The challenge going forward, then, will be for 
government officials and their private-sector contractors to work with 
interest groups, academics, legislators, and ultimately the courts to tailor 
Big Data programs in ways that effect a reasonable balance of these 
competing interests.  Although it is beyond the scope of the present Article 
to do so, we offer a sketch below of what some of the broad framework 
might look like.237 
 
235 See Gray & Citron, supra note 7, at 28. 
236 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (“The point of the Fourth 
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.  
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached 
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime.  Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s 
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a 
search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s 
homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.  Crime, even in the privacy of one’s 
own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be 
reached on proper showing.  The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a 
grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in 
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.  When the right of privacy must 
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by 
a policeman or Government enforcement agent.”). 
237 See infra Part IV.D; see also Gray & Citron, supra note 7, at 35–40. 
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IV. HOW DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE SERVES GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN 
PREVENTING, DETECTING, AND PROSECUTING CYBERHARASSMENT 
As Justice Alito notes in his Jones concurrence, we no longer live in a 
“pre-computer age.”238  Quite to the contrary, whether in the form of 
personal computers, tablets, smartphones, cellular phones, video games, the 
Internet, e-mail, or GPS-enabled directional devices, technology is a 
ubiquitous feature of our daily lives.  Access to these technologies has the 
capacity to expand our lives and life projects dramatically by enhancing 
efficiency and giving us ready and immediate access to information and 
people.  These technologies are, in short, liberty enhancing.  The expansion 
of personal and associational liberties offered by modern technologies is not 
entirely free, however.  To the contrary, as Justice Alito points out, much of 
the increased “convenience” and “security” promised by modern 
technology comes “at the expense of privacy.”239  Building on contributions 
to the privacy law project since Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 
seminal 1890 article,240 Justice Alito and others have elaborated many of 
these privacy costs.  Their worries are particularly weighty when the 
government is the observer.241 
Everything we do is subject to digital surveillance.  When we visit 
websites, we leave traceable footprints that include information about our 
Internet service providers (ISPs) and the Internet protocol (IP) addresses 
associated with our computers.242  Most websites deposit cookies on our 
 
238 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
239 Id. at 962.  Some have argued that this apparent conflict between law enforcement 
interests and citizen privacy interests is a “myth.”  See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 118, at 
38–39.  Although important, these arguments actually address another point.  Specifically, 
they point out that law enforcement interests in digital surveillance, say, are derived directly 
from significant citizen privacy and security interests that are best preserved by success in 
detecting and prosecuting crimes like identity theft and cyberharassment.  This is no doubt 
true, but it does not render the conflict moot.  Rather, recognizing the citizen interests that 
stand behind law enforcement interests adds depth and clarity to the crime-control side of the 
Fourth Amendment balancing test.  Whether and how far to service those interests still 
requires taking account of how much privacy it is reasonable to sacrifice to the “competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”  Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 . 
240 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
241 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring 
in the judgment); Gray & Citron, supra note 7, at 23–27. 
242 Although IP addresses are not fixed to our computers, they change less often than was 
once the case, and many ISPs have reverted to using permanent or semipermanent IP 
addresses for users.  As a consequence, tracing Internet activity using IP addresses provides 
more information now than it did even a few years ago, when limited bandwidth often 
required ISPs to reassign a limited number of IP addresses to users as they logged on and off 
the Internet. 
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computers that provide information about our activities to site operators, 
other websites, and advertisement brokers.  Documents sent via networks, 
including e-mail and texts, contain a wealth of information, including 
metadata with time stamps, location information, and other details about 
our activities.  Programs and applications we use on our computers and 
portable devices record and share locational data, pictures, and other 
information about us. 
These vast reservoirs of our location data, e-mails, cookies, and the 
like are prime targets for cyberharassers who want to control, intimidate, 
and terrify victims.  Harassers hack into victims’ computers and portable 
devices to track their whereabouts.  Once inside victims’ computers, they 
forward victims’ sensitive e-mails and intimate pictures to their employers 
and friends.  But, as we shall see, the digital surveillance technologies that 
gather information from these sources can also assist the government in its 
pursuit and prosecution of cyberharassers.  As in Part III, we begin by 
briefly describing how digital surveillance implicates a mosaic theory of 
Fourth Amendment privacy. 
A. DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE AND THE MOSAIC THEORY 
Most of us have at best a vague sense of what and how much digital 
data we generate and share, much less the extent of digital surveillance we 
are subjected to by those who gather, aggregate, and analyze that data.  
Nevertheless, social networking sites, merchants, and data brokers record 
and analyze our digital footprints.  Some do so for immediate commercial 
gain by, for example, targeting advertisements.  Some package the 
information into “digital dossiers,” which they sell to government and 
private clients.243  Law enforcement and other government officials 
routinely contract with these data brokers or directly request or subpoena 
information about our online activities from ISPs, e-mail providers, and 
search engines.244 
Government agencies are also directly involved in digital surveillance.  
On an investigative level, federal agents who nobly pursue child 
pornographers use a toolkit of devices—including “Wifinders” and 
proprietary peer-to-peer software, along with strategies like “wardriving”—
to identify computers that are engaged in distributing child pornography 
 
243 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 2 (2004). 
244 Scott Shane and John F. Burns, Twitter Records in Wikileaks Case Are Subpoenaed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at A1.  For example, Google reports that it received over 8,000 
requests for information from agencies in the United States between July and December 
2012.  Transparency Report: United States, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparency
report/userdatarequests/US/ (last visited May 21, 2013). 
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and to find images of child pornography on suspects’ hard drives.245  The 
Wall Street Journal recently reported that the National Counterterrorism 
Center has been “grant[ed] authority for unprecedented government 
surveillance of U.S. citizens” using aggregated data, regardless of whether 
targets are suspected of criminal activity.246  As a result of this new 
authorization, the Center will have access to most government databases, 
potentially including financial information processed through federally 
guaranteed mortgage programs and health records for anyone treated at a 
federal facility or covered by federal insurance programs, such as Medicare 
and Medicaid.247  Perhaps most ominously, a network of fusion centers, 
which are operated jointly by law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and 
private contractors, and sit at strategic Internet and communications 
chokepoints, appear to have realized the vision of the Department of 
Defense’s much-maligned Total Information Awareness program.248 
This web of digital surveillance is so broad and subtle, in fact, that it 
was able to snare former Central Intelligence Agency Director David 
Petreaus.249  During the course of an investigation into allegedly harassing 
e-mails sent to a Tampa-area event planner, FBI agents used metadata, ISP 
information, IP addresses, and, eventually, a warranted electronic search of 
an e-mail account, to determine that the suspect mails were sent by 
Petraeus’s biographer, Paula Broadwell.250  As a by-product, investigators 
also discovered evidence of an extramarital affair between Petraeus and 
 
245 United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 271–72 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v Gorski, 71 M.J. 729, 731–
32 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2012); United States v. Ahrndt, 3:08-CR-00468-KI, 2013 WL 
179326, at *1–3 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2013); United States v. Broadhurst, 3:11-CR-00121-MO-1, 
2012 WL 5985615, at *1–2 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012); United States v. Stanley, Crim. No. 11-
272, 2012 WL 5512987, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2012); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, 
Lincolnton Man Sentenced to 87 Months in Prison on Child Pornography Charges (Aug. 9, 
2012), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ncw/pressreleases/Charlotte-2012-08-09-byrd.html.  As 
we point out below and elsewhere, we see both the investigative self-constraints and 
technological precommitments under which these technologies operate as examples of 
precisely where and how agencies, legislatures, and courts should strike the reasonable 
balance required by the Fourth Amendment after Jones.  See Gray & Citron, supra note 7. 
246 Julia Angwin, U.S. Terror Agency to Tap Citizen Files, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2012, at 
A1. 
247 Id. 
248 Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic 
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1443 (2011). 
249 Evan Perez et al., FBI Scrutinized on Petraeus—Complaints by Female Social 
Planner Led to Email Trail that Undid CIA Chief, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 12, 2012, at A1; Scott 
Shane & Charlie Savage, Officials Say F.B.I. Knew of Petraeus Affair in the Summer, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/us/us-officials-say-petraeuss-
affair-known-in-summer.html?pagewanted=all. 
250 Perez et al., supra note 249; Shane & Savage, supra note 249. 
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Broadwell, the revelation of which led Petraeus to resign from his position 
at the CIA.  Marc Rotenberg, executive director of the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, noted that this kind of investigation creep is “a 
particular problem with cyber investigations [in that] they rapidly become 
open-ended because there’s such a huge quantity of information available 
and it’s so easily searchable.”251  Commenting on the potential privacy 
threats of digital surveillance, Rotenberg pointed out that “[i]f the C.I.A. 
director can get caught, it’s pretty much open season on everyone else.”252 
As the Wall Street Journal notes, digital surveillance programs like 
fusion centers and the initial stages of the probe that led to the discovery of 
Petraeus’s affair are outside the scope of Fourth Amendment review 
because they involve information that is either exposed to public 
observation or voluntarily shared with third parties.253  They are, however, 
precisely the sorts of investigative technologies, methods, and techniques 
that a mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy would encompass.  
They are broad, indiscriminate, capable of almost infinite expansion, and 
therefore not subject to the practical constraints that limit more traditional 
surveillance techniques.254  They are also surreptitious and therefore 
“susceptible to abuse.”255  In short, granting the “Government . . . unfettered 
discretion” to engage in digital surveillance threatens to “alter the 
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to 
democratic society.”256 
Given the invasive potential of digital surveillance, it is easy to see, 
from a citizen privacy point of view, why digital surveillance and other 
cyberinvestigative techniques should be subject to Fourth Amendment 
regulation.  As explained in Part II, however, “regulation” does not mean 
prohibition.  Rather, limiting law enforcement’s discretion to engage in 
digital surveillance will require balancing these Fourth Amendment privacy 
concerns against legitimate governmental interests in detecting and 
 
251 Scott Shane, Petraeus Case: Issue of Privacy Is in Play Too, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
2012, at A1. 
252 Id. 
253 Angwin, supra note 246 (stating that the Fourth Amendment “doesn’t cover records 
the government creates in the normal course of business with citizens”). 
254 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment); see also Gray & Citron, supra note 7, at 28–41 (arguing that technology capable 
of facilitating broad and indiscriminate surveillance should be subject to Fourth Amendment 
regulation). 
255 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Susan Freiwald, The 
Four Factor Test, USVJONES.COM, http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/the-four-factor-test/
#more-205 (last visited May 21, 2013) (arguing that the capacity to conduct surreptitious 
surveillance is a significant factor in evaluating Fourth Amendment regulation). 
256 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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prosecuting crime.  In the next section we explore one such area of law 
enforcement interest: cyberharassment. 
B. THE VALUE OF DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE IN COMBATING 
CYBERHARASSMENT 
Cyberharassment is a widespread and growing challenge for law 
enforcement in the United States.  These online attacks feature threats of 
violence, privacy invasions, reputation-harming falsehoods, impersonation, 
computer hacking, and extortion.  They often appear in e-mails, instant 
messages, blog entries, message boards, or sites devoted to tormenting 
individuals.  As the executive director of the National Center for Victims of 
Crime explained in her congressional testimony supporting the 2006 
cyberstalking amendment to the Violence Against Women Act: 
[S]talkers are using very sophisticated technology . . . —installing spyware on your 
computer so that they can track all of your interactions on the Internet, your 
purchases, your e-mails and so forth, and then using that against you, forwarding e-
mails to people at your job, broadcasting your whereabouts, your purchases, your 
reading habits and so on, or installing GPS in your car so that you will show up at the 
grocery store, at your local church, wherever and there is the stalker and you can’t 
imagine how the stalker knew that you were going to be there. . . .  I am happy that 
this legislation amends the statute so that prosecutors have more effective tools, I 
think, to address technology through VAWA 2005.257 
Although some attackers confine their harassment to networked 
technologies, others use all available tools to harass victims, including real-
space contact.  Offline harassment or stalking often includes abusive phone 
calls, vandalism, threatening mail, and physical assault.258 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 850,000 adults 
experienced stalking with an online component in 2006, including threats in 
e-mails, text messages, chat rooms, and blogs.259  Young people are even 
more likely to experience some form of cyberharassment.  The National 
Center for Education Statistics reports that, during the 2008–2009 school 
year, 1.5 million young people in the United States were victims of some 
form of cyberharassment.260  Already a significant problem, 
 
257 Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 18, 27–28 (2005) (statement of Mary Lou Leary, Executive 
Director, National Center for Victims of Crime). 
258 WORKING TO HALT ONLINE ABUSE, supra note 12. 
259 CITRON, supra note 8 (citing KATRINA BAUM ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2009)). 
260 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT REPORTS OF 
BULLLYING AND CYBER-BULLYING: RESULTS FROM THE 2009 SCHOOL CRIME SUPPLEMENT TO 
THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 1 (2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/
pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2011336. 
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cyberharassment is on the rise.  College students now report more sexually 
harassing speech in online interactions than in face-to-face ones.  As the 
National Institute of Justice explains, the “ubiquity of the Internet and the 
ease with which it allows others unusual access to personal information” 
make individuals more accessible and vulnerable to online abuse.261  
Harassing someone online is far cheaper and less personally risky than 
confronting them in real space.262 
Cyberharassment and the identity of its victims follow the well-worn 
pathways of bias crimes.  The most recent Bureau of Justice Statistics 
findings report that 74% of online stalking victims are female.263  
Perpetrators are far more likely to be men.264  Unsurprisingly, the content of 
these attacks are often sexually explicit and demeaning, drawing 
predominantly on gender stereotypes.  As one blogger observed, “[t]he fact 
is, to be a woman online is to eventually be threatened with rape and death.  
On a long enough timeline, the chances of this not occurring drop to 
 
261 Cyberharassment is so easy, in fact, that it has spawned a new breed of social 
creature, the troll, who engages in provocative, and sometimes obscene, vitriolic, abusive, or 
hateful speech, in order to generate strong emotional responses.  Whitney Phillips provides a 
useful history of Internet trolls in a recent essay published in The Atlantic online.  Whitney 
Phillips, What an Academic Who Wrote Her Dissertation on Trolls Thinks of Violentacrez, 
THEATLANTIC.COM (Oct. 15, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2012/10/what-an-academic-who-wrote-her-dissertation-on-trolls-thinks-of-
violentacrez/263631/.  As Phillips points out, the phenomenon of Internet trolling is 
complicated from a postcritical, sociocultural point of view.  After all, many trolls are less 
than sincere, either because they are thoughtfully ironic or because they get a base thrill out 
of causing offense.  Most trolls also keep it impersonal and do not engage in personal or 
exploitative attacks.  They are the satirists of our age, and play an important role in online 
discourse.  For some trolls, however, manners, sophistication, empathy, and humility do not 
advise such restraint.  As Phillips points out, whether the conduct of these trolls masks or 
reveals their true opinions is pretty nearly irrelevant.  After all, “whether or not the troll 
‘really’ hates women, for example, doesn’t matter if the targeted women feel hated.”  Id.  We 
discuss the recent unmasking of one troll, “Violentacrez,” below. 
262 Stalking, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/stalking/
welcome.htm (last visited May 21, 2013). 
263 CITRON, supra note 8, at 5 (citing BAUM ET AL., supra note 259, at 5).  Similarly, 
statistics from the National Center for Victims of Crime find that 70% of stalking cases 
involve female victims.  Id.  The U.S. National Violence Against Women Survey reports that 
60% of cyberstalking victims are women.  Id. (citing Molly M. Ginty, Cyberstalking Turns 
Web Technologies into Weapons, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Apr. 7, 2012, at J1).  A University of 
Maryland study of online attacks showed that users with female names received on average 
100 malicious private messages, which the study defined as “sexually explicit or threatening 
language,” for every four received by male users.  CITRON, supra note 8, at 5 (citing ROBERT 
MEYER AND MICHEL CUKIER, ASSESSING THE ATTACK THREAT DUE TO IRC CHANNELS 467–72 
(2006)). 
264 Women were more likely to be targeted by men (67%) than women (24%).  CITRON, 
supra note 8, at 5 (citing BAUM ET AL., supra note 259, at 4). 
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zero.”265 
Cyberharassment also follows racial lines.  A study conducted in 2009 
asked 992 undergraduate students about their experience with 
cyberharassment.  According to this study, nonwhite females faced 
cyberharassment more than any other group, with 53% reporting having 
been harassed online.  Next were white females, with 45% reporting having 
been targeted online, with nonwhite males right behind them at 40%.  The 
group least likely to have been harassed was white males, at 31%.266  
Across race, being lesbian, transgender, or bisexual also raised the risk of 
being harassed.267 
Another disturbing feature of cyberharassment is that it tends to be 
perpetrated by groups rather than individuals.  Those who engage in abusive 
online conduct often move in packs.268  Cyberharassers frequently engage 
proxies to help torment their victims.269  These group attacks bear all of the 
hallmarks of violent mob behavior.  So much so, in fact, that one of us has 
dubbed them “cyber mobs.”270  As with sole practitioners, online mob 
harassment is more likely to be perpetrated by members of dominant 
demographics, and to draw on popular stigmas for the purpose of shaming 
and degrading their targets.271 
Of course, cold statistics and general description tell at best part of the 
story of legitimate government and law enforcement interests in preventing, 
detecting, and prosecuting cyberharassment.  Recent efforts to highlight the 
privacy interests that compel recognition of the mosaic theory of Fourth 
Amendment privacy make liberal use of individual stories, in part to pluck 
 
265 Yuki Onna, Let Me Tell You About the Birds and the Bees: Gender and the Fallout 
Over Christopher Priest, RULES FOR ANCHORITES: LETTERS FROM PROXIMA THULE (Apr. 6, 
2012), http://yuki-onna.livejournal.com/675153.html. 
266 Bradford W. Reyns, Being Pursued Online: Extent and Nature of Cyberstalking 
Victimization from a Lifestyle/Routine Activities Perspective 96–97 (May 7, 2010) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cinicinnati), available at 
http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Reyns%20Bradford%20W.pdf?ucin1273840781. 
267 Lisa Stone of BlogHer has observed that the more famous, the more lesbian, and the 
more non-white the female blogger, the more vicious the cyberharassment.  Lisa Stone, 
Hating Hate Speech: Safety for Kathy Sierra and All Women Online, BLOGHER (Mar. 27, 
2007, 1:47 AM), http://www.blogher.com/hating-hate-speech-safety-kathy-sierra-and-all-
women-online. 
268 CITRON, supra note 8, at 9. 
269 PAUL BOCIJ, CYBERSTALKING: HARASSMENT IN THE INTERNET AGE AND HOW TO 
PROTECT YOUR FAMILY 67 (2004). 
270 Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 13, at 104, 113. 
271 Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification and Internet Misogyny, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 68, 73 (Saul Levmore & Martha Nussbaum 
eds., 2010). 
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empathetic strings in the audience.272  In weighing the competing interests 
at stake in regulating access to and use of digital surveillance technologies, 
it is therefore fair to consider the impact of crimes like cyberharassment in 
individual cases. 
Take the publicly reported case of D.C. v. R.R.273  D.C. was a high 
school student who was actively pursuing a career in the entertainment 
industry as a singer and actor.274  He used a pseudonym in his professional 
career,275 under which he maintained a fan site that, among other features, 
allowed visitors to post comments to a “guestbook.”  Several students at 
D.C.’s school, who were later identified in a civil suit, engaged in a pattern 
of targeted harassment of D.C. by posting comments to his website.  Some 
were simply offensive—one student told D.C. that he was “the biggest fag 
in the [high school] class.”276  Others, however, went much further, 
threatening physical and sexual violence in graphic detail.  One person 
posted on D.C.’s website, “I want to rip out your fucking heart and feed it to 
you. . . .  If I ever see you I’m . . . going to pound your head in with an ice 
pick.  Fuck you, you dick-riding penis lover.  I hope you burn in hell.”277  
Another post told D.C. that he was “now officially wanted dead or alive,” 
and a third promised to “unleash my manseed in those golden brown 
eyes.”278 
According to a California appellate court, the contents of these posts 
suggested that “[t]he students . . . sought to destroy D.C.’s life, threatened 
to murder him, and wanted to drive him out of [his high school] and the 
community in which he lived.”279  In that goal they were successful.  On 
 
272 See Tamara Rice Lave, Privacy, Poverty, and People Like Us: Rethinking the Fourth 
Amendment after US v Jones (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (arguing that 
Fourth Amendment privacy interests only gain traction once a critical mass of citizens on 
and off the courts feel that their personal expectations of privacy are threatened). 
273 D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Reptr. 3d 399 (Ct. App. 2010). 
274 Id. at 405. 
275 Id. at 409. 
276 Id. at 412. 
277 Id. at 422. 
278 Id. at 406. 
279 Id.  The students who posted to D.C.’s website disputed this conclusion.  Despite the 
vivid, violent, and homophobic content of his post, one student claimed: 
My motivations in sending this email had nothing to do with any perception of [D.C.’s] sexual 
orientation, and certainly did not reflect an intention to do him physical harm.  As set forth 
above, I had no personal knowledge or belief about [D.C.’s] sexual orientation.  No one ever told 
me he was gay, and I had no thoughts on the subject matter.  My message is fanciful, hyperbolic, 
jocular, and taunting and was motivated by [D.C.’s] pompous, self aggrandizing, and narcissistic 
website—not his sexual orientation.  My only other motivation, a bit more pathological, was to 
win the one-upmanship contest that was tacitly taking place between the message posters. 
Id. at 410 (alterations in original).  The California court noted, however, that in cases of 
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advice of law enforcement, who consulted the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, D.C. withdrew from his school and moved with his family to 
the other end of the state.280  Despite these efforts, the student newspaper at 
his former school reported his new location and the name of his new 
institution.281  As a consequence of this harassment, D.C. developed a 
persistent anxiety disorder.282 
Cyberharassment has also spawned a new brand of extortion labeled 
“sextortion.”283  This is a form of blackmail in which the extortionist 
threatens to publicize images or information that his target might find 
embarrassing unless the victim provides sexually explicit pictures and 
videos or agrees to participate in live sex shows via Skype or other direct 
video communications.284  One infamous perpetrator of sextortion schemes 
invaded his targets’ computers using malicious software that allowed him to 
mine his victims’ hard drives for compromising images or to capture 
images using their own computer cameras.285  He then used those images 
and access to his targets’ computers and e-mail accounts to terrorize them 
until they agreed to produce sexually explicit pictures or videos for him.  
Young people are particularly vulnerable.286  Teenagers who are extorted 
into engaging in explicit sex acts under threat and at such a formative stage 
of their development are also more likely to suffer scarring emotional and 
psychological harm.287  As United States Attorney Joseph Hogsett put the 
 
tortious threats, “[t]he speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.”  Id. at 414 
(quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003)). 
280 Id. at 406. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. at 408. 
283 See Charles Wilson, Feds: Online ‘Sextortion’ of Teens on the Rise, NBC NEWS 
(Aug. 15, 2010, 2:39 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38714259/ns/technology_and_
science-security/t/feds-online-sextortion-teens-rise#.UOpEpm_AeSo (describing the crime 
and recounting the facts of several cases). 
284 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Maine Resident Charged and Arrested for Allegedly 
Engaging in Cyber “Sextortion” of New Hampshire Victim (July 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-crm-886.html. 
285 Nate Anderson, How an Omniscient Internet “Sextortionist” Ruined the Lives of Teen 
Girls, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 7, 2011, 1:02 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/09/
how-an-omniscient-internet-sextortionist-ruined-lives/. 
286 Wilson, supra note 283; Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Indiana Man 
Charged with Interstate Sextortion of Children (Apr. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/indianapolis/press-releases/2012/indiana-man-charged-with-interstate-
sextortion-of-children (reporting the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrest of an Indiana 
man for using this scheme to extort two fourteen-year-old boys into recording sexually 
explicit videos). 
287 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION 
PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION: REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/psc/docs/natstrategyreport.pdf. 
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point when commenting on a successful prosecution, “This defendant may 
not remember his alleged victims, but the true tragedy is that not one of 
them will ever forget.”288 
Cyberharassers engage in telephone harassment as well.  For example, 
in September 2010, Daniel Leonard pleaded guilty to a pattern of 
harassment that involved over 4,000 threatening and sexually explicit phone 
calls made to over 1,200 phone numbers using an Internet “spoofing” 
service that masked his phone number from the call recipients.289  Others go 
further still by using the Internet to incite others to rape and stalk victims. 
Federal prosecutors recently brought a cyberstalking indictment 
against a man who impersonated his ex-girlfriend online over a four-year 
period, inciting others to stalk her in person.  The man posted online 
advertisements with the victim’s contact information and her alleged desire 
for sex with strangers.  On porn sites, he uploaded videos of her having sex 
(which he filmed while they were dating) alongside her contact 
information.290  Because strange men began appearing at her home 
demanding sex, the woman changed her name and moved to another state.  
Her ex-boyfriend discovered her new personal information and again posted 
her name, address, and an invitation to have sex on pornography sites next 
to her picture.  The cycle repeated itself, with strange men coming to her 
house at night demanding sex.  Although this victim was never physically 
assaulted, others are not so lucky. 
In December 2009, Ty McDowell broke into the home of a woman in 
Casper, Wyoming, tied her up, and raped her.  During the course of the 
 
288 Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 286. 
289 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Olympia Resident Pleads Guilty to Cyber-Stalking, 
Threatening and Obscene Phone Calls Using Internet ‘Spoofing’ Service (Sept. 14, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2010/leonardPlea. 
pdf. 
290 United States v. Sayer, Crim. Nos. 2:11-CR-113-DBH, 2:11-CR-47-DBH, 2012 WL 
1714746 (D. Me. May 15, 2012); Susan Brenner, Wi-Fi, Curtilage and Kyllo, 
CYB3RCRIM3 (June 27, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2012/06/wi-fi-
curtilage-and-kyllo.html; Judy Harrison, Biddeford Man Sentenced to Five Years in Federal 
Prison for Cyberstalking, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Dec. 4, 2012, 3:59 PM), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2012/12/04/news/portland/biddeford-man-sentenced-to-five-
years-in-prison-for-cyberstalking/.  Shawn Memarian pleaded guilty to cyberstalking under 
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B)(i), admitting that he sent threatening e-mails to the victim and 
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home address, and claimed her interest in sex after which over thirty men showed up at her 
house seeking sex.  Report and Recommendation to Accept Defendant’s Guilty Plea, United 
States v. Memarian, No. 08-00128-01-CR-W-NKL (W.D. Mo. Jan. 9, 2009); News Release, 
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attack, he told her: “You want an aggressive man, bitch, I’ll show you 
aggressive.”291  Although McDowell did not know his victim, his crime was 
not random.  Rather, he had responded to an online advertisement posted on 
Craigslist that purported to be from a woman seeking to fulfill her own rape 
fantasies.  After a lengthy correspondence with the ad’s poster, McDowell 
believed that he was fulfilling his victim’s desires.292  He was not.  As a 
subsequent investigation would reveal, McDowell was in communication 
with Jebediah Stipe, who posted the ad and arranged the attack on his ex-
girlfriend.293  Stipe and McDowell were sentenced to sixty-year prison 
terms after pleading guilty to charges of aggravated kidnapping, rape, and 
burglary.294 
Cyberharassment can also be more general.  Sites that encourage 
sexualized online abuse are all too common.  The website IsAnyoneUp.com 
provides a notorious example.  For a time, it was one of the most popular 
forums on the Internet for “revenge porn,” which entails spurned former 
lovers posting sexualized pictures of their ex-wives and ex-girlfriends on a 
public forum so that others can leer at and demean them.295  Although 
IsAnyoneUp.com eventually shut down amidst protests and outcry, its 
operator, Hunter Moore, started a similar site under a different name, 
HunterMoore.TV, which may eventually include not only pictures of 
women, but also an overlaid map to the homes of those featured in the 
pictures.296  Consider too “Violentacrez,” a notorious Reddit administrator 
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293 Id. 
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submitted-photos-to-peoples-addresses/.  Moore later claimed he had been “drunk” during 
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who oversaw forums like “Jailbait,” “Creepshots,” “Rapebait,” “Incest,” 
“Beatingwomen,” and “Picsofdeadjailbait,” each of which featured pictures 
and commentary from his followers that celebrated the interests described 
by the forums’ titles.297 
There is, of course, much more to be written about the incidents and 
dynamics of cyberharassment crimes.  For present purposes, however, the 
foregoing is sufficient to show that there are significant and legitimate 
governmental interests at stake in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting 
various forms of cyberharassment.  Although cyberharassment is relatively 
new, executives and legislatures have manifested these interests by setting 
up dedicated enforcement units and passing tailored criminal statutes.298  As 
we argue in the next section, adopting a mosaic theory of the Fourth 
Amendment likely will implicate these law enforcement concerns by 
limiting access to both existing and future digital surveillance techniques 
and technologies.299 
C. HOW DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE SERVES GOVERNMENTAL 
INTERESTS IN PREVENTING, DETECTING, AND PROSECUTING 
CYBERHARASSMENT 
Among the most important methods and strategies used by law 
enforcement to track and apprehend those who engage in cyberharassment 
and related crimes are: (1) to identify and track the IP addresses associated 
with the offending posts and e-mails, (2) to identify and track Media Access 
Control (MAC) addresses associated with individual computers used in 
perpetrating these offenses, (3) to use proprietary software to identify the 
source of images and other files offered through peer-to-peer networks, and 
(4) to use data screens that monitor Internet traffic for files containing 
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criminal content.300  In this Part, we explain some of the complications that 
Jones might present with respect to the use of these technologies to identify 
and prosecute cyberharassers. 
Computers connected to the Internet have or share IP addresses.  
Although the United States has not adopted mandatory data-retention rules 
like those promulgated by the European Union, ISPs keep records of IP 
addresses assigned to particular computers at specific times.  According to 
recent reports, major ISPs, such as Verizon and Comcast, generally retain 
IP addresses from six months to a year.301  As former Deputy Attorney 
General Jason Weinstein reported in testimony before the House 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, these policies 
are generous by industry standards, but nevertheless may not be long 
enough to serve many or most law enforcement goals.302  Let us 
nevertheless suppose that law enforcement obtains the IP addresses 
associated with harassing posts within this six-month timeframe.  With that 
information in hand, officials can usually secure the name and account 
information for the user of that IP address from the ISP that assigned it or 
from the websites and social networking sites that have been accessed using 
the identified IP address.303  If the IP address is permanently or 
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semipermanently assigned to a computer, law enforcement can track its 
user’s online activities more broadly. 
Tracing posters through their computers is not always so 
straightforward a task, of course.  Harassers can use public computers in 
libraries or cafes that do not require registration, limiting traceability 
through the IP address.  In these cases, however, law enforcement agents 
may be able to use Wifinders and other technologies that can identify 
individual computers that log onto these open networks by using their MAC 
addresses.304  In further efforts to hide their identities, however, harassing 
posters can employ free and easy-to-use software like Tor, which 
establishes anonymous Internet connections by funneling Web traffic 
through encrypted “virtual tunnels.”305  This can make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify IP addresses connected to harassing conduct.  Even 
if posters do not try to hide their identities, their computers may share an IP 
address with others in a network, which is often the case for universities 
and workplaces.306  The IP address would then be of limited help because it 
could not identify a specific computer on the network.  Further 
complicating matters, some site operators refuse to collect IP addresses 
from their subscribers at all. 
Despite these complications, tracing an IP address is a common and 
effective way for authorities to identify perpetrators of cyberharassment 
crimes.  At present, the public-observation and third-party doctrines grant 
law enforcement unfettered discretion to track IP addresses across the 
Internet.  Most cyberharassment is, to one degree or another, public.  
Furthermore, the third-party doctrine means that law enforcement officers 
need a subpoena, at most, to secure user information associated with an IP 
address from ISPs and other third parties, including social-networking 
sites.307  A mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy might well change 
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all of this.  Tracking someone’s online activities using an IP address over a 
period of time is akin to tracking a person through physical space using 
GPS-enabled tracking devices.  By aggregating information about a user 
and his online activities, law enforcement officers using these fairly basic 
digital surveillance techniques can therefore assemble precisely the sorts of 
revealing informational mosaics that worried the concurring Justices in 
Jones. 
Digital surveillance technology that offends mosaic sensibilities 
promises even more benefits than IP traces to law enforcement officers 
interested in detecting cybercrimes.  Take, for example, forums such as 
those organized and moderated by Violentacrez.308  Although under current 
law and free speech doctrine it is perfectly legal to view and comment on 
pictures of young women in public, law enforcement officers might have 
reason to worry that habitués of forums like “Jailbait” and “Creepshots” are 
more likely than most to produce or possess actual child pornography.  It is, 
of course, impossible to conduct even cursory investigations of the tens and 
hundreds of thousands of those who visit these sites, much less to 
distinguish between casual curiosity seekers and practicing pedophiles.  
Here, broad-scale aggregation technology, in combination with ever more 
sophisticated data analytics designed to identify and track those patterns of 
online conduct that correlate with higher risks of illegal on- and offline 
activities, would be tremendously valuable to law enforcement.  Once 
officers have identified a smaller universe of potential offenders, they can 
then further narrow their investigative fields by using passive techniques 
like online honey traps to more definitively identify those who are 
trafficking in or actively seeking to possess child pornography.309  Again, 
although these digital surveillance techniques and technologies are not 
presently subject to Fourth Amendment review, either individually or in the 
aggregate, the situation would likely change under a mosaic theory.  In fact, 
officers might find themselves assembling informational mosaics sufficient 
to trigger Fourth Amendment concerns quite by accident.310  Regardless, 
law enforcement’s legitimate interests in using digital surveillance 
technology would be affected.311 
Fusion centers also hold significant potential for law enforcement’s 
efforts to detect and prosecute cyberharassment.  The Department of 
Justice, in conjunction with the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
 
308 Fitzpatrick & Griffin, supra note 297. 
309 United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 517–18 (3d Cir. 2010) (recounting an 
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310 Kerr, Mosaic, supra note 19, at 314–19, 337. 
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Children, maintains a substantial database of known images of child 
pornography, each of which has a unique digital fingerprint called a “hash 
value.”312  Fusion centers, which have access to most Internet traffic, 
provide a unique—although as yet unexploited—resource that law 
enforcement agents can use to screen for the transmission of known images 
of child exploitation.  Outside the relatively narrow field of child 
pornography cases, those who engage in cyberharassment and cyberstalking 
still tend to use a fairly predictable pattern of words, phrases, and images.  
The software used by most malicious stalkers also tends to come from a 
stable of online resources, which again bear an identifiable digital signature.  
Although the true technical capacities of fusion centers are largely unknown 
to the public, they appear to have the ability to monitor Internet and 
communications traffic for precisely these sorts of markers.  That same 
capacity is, of course, precisely what raises concerns about fusion centers 
from a mosaic theory point of view.  Here again, the prospect of adopting a 
mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy raises serious concerns that 
the legitimate and important law enforcement goals of detecting and 
prosecuting cybercrimes may be compromised. 
D. STRIKING A REASONABLE BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND 
LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN PREVENTING, 
DETECTING, AND PROSECUTING CYBERHARASSMENT 
In reflecting on the challenges for citizens, law enforcement officers, 
courts, and policymakers posed by contemporary calls to limit law 
enforcement’s use of and access to digital surveillance technology, former 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jason Weinstein summed up the stakes: 
So, in considering whether to rewrite the standards that govern law enforcement 
access to electronic data, policy makers need to consider that choices made out of a 
desire to enhance privacy may ultimately reduce it, by making it difficult—and in 
some cases impossible—for law enforcement to pursue the criminals who pose a 
threat to privacy.  More broadly, those choices will have very real consequences for 
public safety, as they will significantly reduce the ability of law enforcement to 
investigate and prosecute a wide array of serious crimes.313 
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this Article to propose specific 
compromises.  Our purpose is, rather, to outline the competing interests and 
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to give due weight to the legitimate law enforcement goals at issue.  As 
Judge Posner astutely observed, “[T]he [Fourth] [A]mendment cannot 
sensibly be read to mean that police shall be no more efficient in the 
twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth.”314  With this in mind, 
the broad outlines of some potential compromises begin to appear. 
First, it is important to keep in mind that the interests of law 
enforcement officers in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting online crimes 
like cyberharassment and cyberstalking are not antagonistic to the interests 
of citizens.  Neither are they necessarily antagonistic to privacy interests.  
Rather, as Weinstein points out, consistent and efficient detection and 
prosecution of these crimes are privacy enhancing, even in the mosaic 
sense, in that law enforcement success makes online activities safer (and 
hence less invasive of privacy at the hands of harassers), more accessible, 
and therefore more useful.315  This does not mean, of course, that law 
enforcement officers, engaged in the “often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime,” will not encroach on privacy in the name of preserving 
it.  As the mosaic theory reminds us, perfect security and perfect privacy are 
mutually exclusive.  The challenge, therefore, is to strike a reasonable 
balance while keeping in mind the fact that law enforcement does not 
pursue digital surveillance out of prurient interests or a desire to realize 
some Orwellian dystopia.  Rather, their interests are our interests. 
Second, achieving a reasonable balance between the various interests 
at stake in regulating digital surveillance technology under the mosaic 
theory is unlikely to be a one-size-fits-all affair.  In some cases, a warrant 
requirement may strike the right balance.  In other cases, it may be too 
restrictive.  In some cases, prior judicial review of a proposed course of 
investigation may be required, as is the case now for wiretaps and most 
searches of homes.  In others, post hoc review following the model in place 
now for most arrests in public may provide sufficient protection of Fourth 
Amendment rights.  Those who design and deploy digital surveillance 
technologies may also be able to incorporate internal controls that will limit 
use and access to end users, thereby effecting the reasonable balance of 
interests required by the Fourth Amendment.316  The ultimate drivers will, 
of course, be the interests at stake. 
Third, resolving competing interests at stake in a mosaic analysis of 
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digital surveillance technology will not be a static affair.  The fundamental 
nature of the home and the techniques available to conduct physical 
searches of homes have changed little since 1791.  As a consequence, the 
solutions developed by courts to contend with physical searches of the 
home have been fairly stable over time.317  Digital surveillance is a different 
matter.  The physical, virtual, and social structures of digital spaces are 
rapidly evolving.  So too are the scope and nature of our engagements with 
digital devices and the intersections between our carbon-constrained and 
silicon-dependent lives.  As the world changes, our reasonable expectations 
of privacy inevitably will change as well.  Digital surveillance technologies 
are also changing rapidly, providing law enforcement with new tools 
capable of aggregating and analyzing more and more data from more and 
more sources.  Protecting Fourth Amendment rights in this dynamic 
environment will require courts, legislators, and law enforcement officials 
to find a principled, yet flexible, approach to understanding and balancing 
competing interests.318 
V. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this Article has been to raise questions and issues rather 
than to answer them.  It has certainly not been our goal to offer a 
comprehensive approach to Fourth Amendment cases after United States v. 
Jones.  Rather, our concern here has been to describe some of the most 
important variables that courts and others interested in securing Fourth 
Amendment protections under a mosaic theory will need to consider when 
striking the balance of competing interests that the Fourth Amendment 
requires.  In particular, we have emphasized the important and perfectly 
legitimate interests of law enforcement officers in using Big Data and 
digital surveillance technology to prevent, detect, and prosecute two 
increasingly significant classes of cybercrime: healthcare fraud and 
cyberharassment.  We have also proposed in loose terms a framework that 
courts and policymakers might employ as they seek both to accommodate 
the needs of law enforcement and to protect citizens’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy.  Among the most important features of that 
framework is an emphasis on context and adaptability.  If the Fourth 
Amendment is to maintain its role as a bulwark against increasing 
governmental surveillance while still allowing law enforcement officers to 
pursue new and evolving forms of criminality in a digital age, then 
inflexibility and stasis are the true enemies and the surest pathways to 
unreasonableness. 
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